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Abstract
This thesis presents a field experiment drawing interferences on the lying be-
havioural patterns among grammar school students. Students were filling in
non-related questionnaire for which they were rewarded. They rolled a dice
and for a corresponding number on a dice they obtained a certain number of
sweets. Students were not controlled therefore they could choose what num-
ber to report. The experiment included one treatment for individuals and two
treatments for groups. The analysis shows that a certain fraction of students
cheated but they often did not exploit the possibility of cheating maximally.
Older students cheated more in comparison with younger students and younger
students deceived more in groups. Last but not least, dishonesty in groups may
also hinge on the family background, namely on the number of siblings. The
model of self-concept maintenance explains the cheating patterns observed in
our experiment best among all discussed models.
JEL Classification C71, C93, D03, D71





Tato práce prezentuje experiment zkoumaj́ıci schémata podváděńı mezi stu-
denty gymnázíı. Studenti vyplnili nesouvisej́ıćı dotazńık, za který byli následně
odměněni. Hodili kostkou a za př́ıslušný počet na kostce dostali určitý počet
sladkost́ı. Protože nebyli kontrolováni, mohli se rozhodnout, jaký počet nahláśı.
Experiment obsahoval jednu úpravu pro jednotlivce a dvě pro skupiny. Analýza
ukázala, že určitá část podváděla, ale často nevyuž́ıvala maximálńı možnost
podváděńı. Starš́ı studenti podváděli v́ıce než mladš́ı studenti a mladš́ı stu-
denti podváděli častěji ve skupinách. V neposledńı řadě data ukázala vztah
poctivosti ve skupinách na počtu sourozencu. Model udržováńı vlastńıho kon-
ceptu nejlépe vysvětluje zjǐstěné znaky podváděńı z experimentu ze všech disku-
tovaných modelu.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
There are many real life situations when lying and cheating lead to higher ben-
efits. People illegally download music from internet, wardrobe1, evade taxes
or cheat in exams. Evidence suggests that typical organization looses an esti-
mated 5% of its annual revenues to occupational fraud, which is $3.5 trillion if
translated into global total fraud losses of Certified Fraud Examiners (2012).
Dishonesty and cheating became part of our lives, often without being consid-
ered as negative. It was found that lying composes 20% to 31% of the whole
social interaction (DePaulo et al. 1996). However, dishonesty is not seen just
on the individual level. Some firms falsify their accounting or manipulate with
audits. Big scandals of corruption and frauds are observed in both financial and
public sector during the history. Furthermore, corruption is not only a local
problem but countries are struggling with this phenomenon worldwide. This
has effects on performance of economies and hinders trust in society. Compa-
nies such as Enron or Worldcom are examples of how problems of dishonesty
and erosion in ethics may lead to massive financial losses due to breaking rules.
It was estimated that Enron and WorldCom fraud cost U.S. economy approx-
imately $37 - $42 billion in the first year alone (Graham et al. 2006).
The following paragraph helps us to shed light on how economists (since Adam
Smith till Gary Becker) understood the process of decision making. Standard
economic models, in which perfectly rational homo economicus is perceived as
a typical agent participating in all transactions, predict results based on utility
maximization. Utility maximization is based on gaining the highest monetary
payoff under given restrictions. According to these models economic agents
1The purchase, use, and then return of the used clothing Mazar et al. (2008); this practice
is also used for electronics, tools and others
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cheat and break rules every time when gains from cheating exceed possible
losses (Becker 1968). Agents take into account three aspects: the expected
benefit from this action, the possibility of being caught and the magnitude of
punishment if being caught. Therefore honesty is considered to be an outcome
of the cost-benefit analysis done by individuals. People are honest up to the
level when dishonesty becomes profitable. Nevertheless, in the real life not
all people cheat and lie in situations where they can improve their well-being.
What are the factors driving them not to cheat? Is it about the size of the
incentive? Is it a question of morals, education? Or do they avoid being seen
by others as liars and untrustworthy persons? Psychology has been a science
which analyzes cheating and dishonesty for the last few decades (Wilson et al.
2003; Polak & Harris 1999) but in the last fifteen years economics, mainly ex-
perimental economics (Gneezy 2005; Sutter 2009), started to explore this field
as well and looked at cheating from different angles than psychology.
Many types of decisions and activities vulnerable to cheating are made in
groups. The decision making in firms is based on the group decision mak-
ing of management, households usually do not make their decisions as single
units and military or government procurement go through the process con-
trolled by a group of people. However, other cases of dishonesty need also at
least two participating parties. A student cannot copy the exam without the
help of another student. The current example of fraudulent actions with inter-
est rate LIBOR shows that there can be multiple party collusion for the sake
of obtaining higher benefits.
There is a rich emerging literature on the group decision making which ad-
dresses the issue if groups decide differently than individuals. Charness &
Sutter (2012) depict a wide survey of economical experiments in their arti-
cle showing that individuals and groups possess other decision features. They
show that groups are more cognitively sophisticated and converge quicker to the
game theoretical equilibrium than individuals. Moreover, groups can overcome
or minimize cognitive biases and limitations. More importantly, the evidence
suggests that groups tend to be more self-interest oriented in the most of set-
tings. On the other hand, there are also counterexamples and this research
question needs further investigations. However, groups seem to be more inter-
ested in the common welfare within the group whereas individuals are more
often concerned about the social welfare of the society as a whole.
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The objective of this thesis is to reveal a level of deception by children and
adolescents. We present an experiment with more than 500 students of the
age 11 – 16 where they filled in non-related questionnaires for which they were
rewarded. They were informed to roll a dice which determined their payoff, 1
to 5 sweets for corresponding number on a dice and nothing if they threw 6.
Since experimenters were not able to control students when rolling a dice, they
themselves decided what number to report. The dice number distribution in a
large sample of observations shows the hidden patterns of cheating behaviour
among students. Moreover, it reveals differences among various subgroups of
children: how lying develops with age, how it differs between genders or if it
is influenced by other family characteristics. The experiment was divided into
three distinct treatments where one was constructed for individuals and two for
groups. The reason behind was to examine disparities in individual and group
decision making. Economic literature (Bucciol & Piovesan 2011) researching
cheating and honesty of children focused on the lying patterns by individuals
whereas we extended experiment for teams. Cheating experiments using coin
or dice as an instrument can be found in the economic literature (Fischbacher &
Heusi 2008), but this thesis contributes to the topic with a different approach
how to examine children’s individual and group decision making. Moreover,
we are able to explore cheating patterns in a broader, not only in a binary
framework.
Our findings can be summarized as follows: Firstly, a certain fraction of stu-
dents cheat but a substantial part do not exploit the whole possibility of cheat-
ing. In other words, they report other numbers than rolled but not the high-
est reward number. Secondly, older students cheat more often in comparison
with younger students when making individual decisions. Thirdly, the finding
suggests that younger students deceive more often in groups than individu-
als. Then, there could be possible influence of family background on cheating.
There is a pattern that groups with on average more siblings cheat less than
groups with on average fewer siblings. Lastly, younger students did realize the
possibility of cheating to smaller extent than older students. Other factors ap-
peared to be insignificant.
The thesis is structured as follows. In chapter 2 is summarized existing litera-
ture with main emphasis on theoretical concepts dealing with cheating, exper-
imental literature and literature focusing on children. Chapter 3 sketches the
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experimental design. In chapter 4 we describe hypotheses. Chapter 5 presents
the methodology and main features of the data processing. Main results are
discussed in chapter 6. The overall comparison of results with aforementioned




For a long time the question of dishonesty and crime had been left unnoticed
by economists. Theories predominantly assumed perfectly rational agents who
make decisions in order to maximize their utility. Gary Becker was the first
author who came up with an idea to employ standard economic theories in
other fields. He applied the same logic of utility maximization in decision mak-
ing to unconventional fields including family or crime. In the influential article
(Becker 1968) he presented motivations and factors that affect committing a
crime. The same underpinning does not hold only for felonies and illegal acts
but also for lie and dishonesty.
The concepts in this paragraph were developed primarily not to explain moti-
vations and reasons for dishonesty. However, they have important implications
for decision making including dishonesty and we compare these implications
with evidence in chapter 7. The economic theory developed by Becker is not
able to explain convincingly some real life phenomena and does not capture
the whole range of motivations. Therefore other authors altered original as-
sumptions or formulated new concepts. These concepts mainly incorporate
psychological foundations and focus on social preferences, not only on econom-
ical reasoning. Fehr, Schmidt, & Rockenbach (1999) pointed out in their paper
that self-interest models are refuted in some situations. They proposed a model
where a fraction of population cares not only about their self-interest but also
about equitable wealth distribution. It has implications for cheating and dis-
honesty where this behaviour is not a question of pure cost-benefit analysis.
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People take into account the distribution and differences in the outcome. The
model predicts that people are not dishonest every time it is profitable for them.
Bolton & Ockenfels (2000) build their model on a similar idea. They assume
a certain threshold where a narrow self-interest is overweighed by a concern of
relative standings. Main interest about a pecuniary payoff is not opposed but
people take into consideration the relative situation of others. Lastly, the de-
cision making, including honesty and dishonesty, may be driven by reciprocity
and social welfare. People sacrifice their own wealth to increase wealth of other
subjects, especially the poor ones. Sometimes they devote their wealth and
income to foster and preserve fair outcome or punish unfair behaviour. As a
consequence people would refrain from cheating in contact with poorer people
and in a case of maintaining of fair outcome.
This was an introduction to the leading concepts in behavioural economics
which describe human behaviour and try to solve puzzles and anomalies as
donations, altruistic actions or revenge and anger. Mazar et al. (2008) present
the theory of the self-concept maintenance which is focused primarily on dis-
honesty. It provides reasons why people lie and cheat just to the extent to keep
their own integrity. This theory serves us as a main theoretical background.
People want to think of themselves as nice and honest persons. On the other
hand they can gain financially by cheating. The authors suggest that people
balance trade-off between these external and internal forces by finding an equi-
librium where they still get some financial profit but keep their self-concept.
To keep a self-concept or integrity means that people do not consider a given
extent of cheating to be bad and immoral. The theory can be decomposed into
two important parts: categorization and attention to standards. Categoriza-
tion is finding rationalizations for certain types of actions and magnitudes of
dishonesty without perceiving them negatively. To illustrate categorization on
a real-life example, we use the example mentioned by the authors. Stealing
a pen worth 1 euro is easier than stealing 1 euro from friend’s wallet because
the first possibility offers more explanations compatible with friendship (I gave
him a pen the last time or that is what friends do). Attention to standards
refers to the fact how often people heed to their own moral standards. The
probability of reflecting an action as dishonest increases with the frequency of
updating own moral standards.
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2.2 Cheating experiments
In this section we discuss main empirical findings in the field of experimen-
tal economics which analyse cheating. In the previous section we outlined the
theoretical foundations exploring mechanisms influencing dishonesty. The the-
ories set general features of how decision processing ideally works. However,
it is impossible to capture all anomalies and behavioural features of the soci-
ety as a whole. Therefore there is always a trade-off between generality and
tractability (simplicity) of a model. Theory is crucial in identifying reasons
and motivations, nevertheless it needs to be confronted with evidence to assess
how its predictions match with reality. It is a big contribution of experimen-
tal economics that makes it possible to test empirically theoretical concepts
and predictions. In the last two decades experimental economics moved from
periphery of economics into the mainstream. Now it is recognized by policy
makers who, thanks to the usage of experiments, implement advices about ef-
fects of certain institutions and policy proposals. Experiments typically capture
behaviour of people in situations where the most general patterns (altruism,
greed or selfishness) are observed but which have a strong explanatory power
for real life phenomena (auctions, donations etc). Huge literature about cheat-
ing cannot be embraced in detail in this thesis, therefore we concentrate on the
literature related to our research.
The researchers choose different ways how to approach cheating and how to
quantify its prevalence in the society. Fischbacher & Heusi (2008) came with
a very simple but effective design revealing the distribution of lying behaviour
among the population. Participants were obliged to throw a dice in order to
determine their payoff. They threw anonymously and received reward accord-
ing to the number reported regardless what they really rolled. Advantage of
this setting is that participants uncover their level of cheating without know-
ing the real purpose of the experiment. We adopt similar approach in our
thesis. The crucial point is a minimal, ideally zero, influence on individuals’
decision making. In the case of zero influence and unawareness of real purpose
of the experiment participants make decisions similar to the real interactions
and external validity is maximized. Moreover, the design allows altering of
experimental conditions (stakes, consequences, anonymity). They found that
39% of people were honest and maximally 22% of lied completely (Fischbacher
& Heusi 2008). The results suggest that a specific fraction of people lied com-
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pletely, some incompletely1 and a certain fraction was honest. Interestingly, a
general pattern of some share of liars, semi-liars and honest persons did not
changed with altering of external conditions although fractions moved with a
change of stake. The authors explain monotonously increasing lying pattern
with lie aversion. People have disutility from lying but the level of disutil-
ity is heterogeneous among people. It implies that for a given stake only a
fraction of people is willing to cheat whereas the rest have higher utility by
remaining honest. However, lie aversion fails to explain incomplete cheating.
Authors proposed alternative explanation for this behaviour using the theory
of self-concept which includes maintaining of personal integrity, honesty and
non-greediness. When participants do not want to be considered greedy but
rather honest then it motivates them not to say the number with the highest
payoff. Number 4 does not have to be assessed as a lie and therefore it could
be the reason why some share of participants lied incompletely.
Another piece of literature written by Sutter (2009) incorporates informational
asymmetries as another strong incentive for deception. The author presents
a cheap-talk experiment where the payoff (different for each player) is paid
according to the choice of the receiver. Nonetheless, the sender can send a
message influencing the decision of the receiver. The payoffs are constructed
in such a manner that motivates senders to deceive the receivers. The rate
of deception is rising with payoff disparity. Senders send not only ”wrong”
messages hoping the receiver will follow their advice but also sophisticated lies.
Sophisticated-lie-tellers send a ”true” message hoping receiver will not follow
advices. Including level-k thinking represented here by sophisticated lies rises
deception rate by 20% - 30% points. A significant share of people was able to
construct a deceptive strategy to mislead the counterpart. However, the level
of deceptive strategy application was dependent on the nominal payoff and its
inequality.
Gneezy (2005) uses a very similar approach but brings a deeper insight into
motivations of lying. His definition of a lie involves: ”A successful or unsuc-
cessful deliberate attempt, without forewarning, to create in another a belief
that the communicator considers to be untrue in order to increase the payoff of
the communicator at the expense of the other side.” On the basis of the results
from the cheap-talk experiment he proposes preferences describing deception
behaviour. People evaluate benefits of lying with a benchmark behaviour repre-
1Incomplete lying means that individuals lie but do not maximize their payoff
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sented by ”truth telling” outcome. According to the author, people are selfish
in terms of maximizing their wealth but sensitive in terms of costs imposed on
the other person by lying. Hence, lying hinges on both relative and nominal
wealth standing. In the real life interactions people are more likely to lie the
wealthier counterparts are because costs caused by lying are less harmful to
them. It is in accord with the results of Sutter (2009).
Not only economical reasons can account for cheating. As we mentioned earlier,
also sensitivity or lie aversion may play a role. However, Houser et al. (2011)
referred to a psychological factor - fairness. They proved a higher likelihood
of cheating when treated unfairly. Participants took part in a dictator game
and then flipped a coin in private. When they felt unjust in the dictator game,
they cheated about 15 percent points more in the second unrelated game. They
lied about the outcome what they tossed when they received nothing or a very
small amount in the dictator game but also when they claimed to have been
treated unfairly.
In the previous section we introduced the theory of self-concept maintenance by
Mazar et al. (2008). They tested the theory empirically, with various alterations
examining what crashes personal integrity and influences level of cheating. The
general setup of all experiments contained a multiple-question task, in which
participants were rewarded according to the number of correctly solved ques-
tions, and the experimenters changed only control conditions. With changing
the control conditions they were able to determine the power and magnitude of
individual parts of their theory, namely attention to moral standards, catego-
rization malleability and opportunity for cheating. Writing the 10 command-
ments before the test had started suppressed level of cheating almost to zero
rate. It means that activating own moral standards make a variation in cheating
and could be an important factor in the general decision making. Similar results
were observed when participants were forced to sign a honour code forbidding
cheating, however, it had a decreasing intensity when the stakes increased. In
accord with the predictions, payoff switch from money to tokens declined at-
tention to standards (categorization malleability) which led to a higher level of
cheating. To state it simply, stealing a bagel in a cafeteria does not have to be
considered as immoral while stealing 3 euro may be. Lastly, a higher possibility
of being caught retrenched cheating. It confirms the thesis that deceptive and
cheating behaviour is affected by how big the opportunity for such behaviour
is. The authors bring convincing evidence that factors not related to pecuniary
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components shift the level of dishonest behaviour. Furthermore, even without
any control, when no punishment impends, the personal magnitude of cheat-
ing is relatively low and individuals adjust the extent of cheating by external
factors.
Shariff & Norenzayan (2007) continued in a similar design. They investigated
whether religion increases prosocial behaviour. The effect of the God reminders
of generosity was according to authors at least as large as reminders of moral
institutions. People felt the presence of the supernatural watchers and hence
were stimulated to contribute more than with neutral or no reminder. However,
Randolph-Seng & Nielsen (2008) criticise their approach from several perspec-
tives. For the purpose of our thesis the criticism of methodological ambiguities
is interesting. The hypothesis of felt presence of the God is not empirically
supported and the authors propose hypothesis based on their own research.
Priming specific representation leads to activation of certain behaviour and
standards. Then the mechanism would be very similar to that proposed by
Mazar et al. (2008). The experiments mentioned in the last two paragraphs
show that honesty and cheating can be influenced with the subtle variation
of settings and can differ by activating self-concept. Although our goal in the
experiment is to keep external conditions constant, we have to be aware what
are the factors that can influence the level of cheating.
The last paper addresses a seemingly unrelated research topic of dishonesty in
self-report of copies made (Goldstone & Chin 1993). Nevertheless, the relevance
of this topic for our research is eminent. In our literature survey it is the only
field experiment executed in a completely natural setting. Results indicate sys-
tematic underreporting of copies made by employees at University of Michigan.
Interesting fact is that employees underestimate the number of copies just par-
tially and do not earn the whole gain even in the absence of external control. It
brings us back to the Fischbacher & Heusi (2008) dice experiment where some
people cheated just incompletely. The researchers in this experiment suggest
that there are strong self-imposed constraints on the level of dishonesty. Pos-
sible explanation for this phenomenon could be the maintenance of self-concept.
In this section we presented an overview of current literature dealing with
collecting evidence on cheating. The first goal was to provide researches show-
ing manifold motivations for dishonesty. Secondly, results from various studies
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show robust patterns of incomplete dishonesty or complete honesty which is in-
consistent with standard models. The most important part of literature for our
research is the evidence studying level of cheating under standard conditions.
Although altering external conditions like activating own moral standards is
not a primary target of this thesis, it helps us to understand the bigger picture
of the decision making.
2.3 Children and cheating
Study of behaviour of children had been a subject of psychology for a long time.
Economics considered it as pointless because children mostly do not participate
in markets and economic transactions. Moreover, it was believed that decision
making works more or less the same for all people. The view has been chang-
ing because of extensive psychological and also economic literature emphasizing
that behavioural features including moral standards develop in the early child-
hood and persist in the adulthood (Talwar & Lee 1999; Polak & Harris 1999).
Furthermore, children often violate the basic assumptions of microeconomic
rational agent. Harbaugh et al. (2001) demonstrated violation of generalized
axiom of revealed preferences (GARP) by children which decreases no sooner
than at the age of eight. In this section we present an economic experiment
with children which goes in line of our research and then we mention psycho-
logical researches confirming differences in behaviour of children and adults.
Bucciol & Piovesan (2011) study the relationship between honesty, age and
self-control what partially contributed to the specification of our research ques-
tions. In our prominent attention is the development of honesty with age.
Children of age ranging from 5 to 15 participated in an experiment by tossing
a coin in private and then recording which side of the coin they tossed. Due
to anonymity at the time of reporting, children could speculate about the side
they actually reported. Although the experimenters were unable do distinguish
dishonesty at the individual level, they analysed proportions of frequencies of
the coin sides of the aggregated data. Children reported winning-side at rates
statistically above 50% but below 100%. Cheating was statistically equal across
children’s characteristics at different ages. It contradicts with the hypothesis
of age development of self-control skills. When experimenters instructed chil-
dren not to cheat, the over-reporting decreased significantly, especially within
girls. Furthermore, the effect of the instruction not to cheat tended to remain
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constant in boys, in girls it decreased with age. The research reveals that even
very young children understand deceptive strategies. On the other side, report-
ing of the losing side by some children suggests that there may be an internal
reward for being honest. This pattern is in accordance with experiments ran
with adults.
Two psychological studies measure dishonesty in early childhood (Polak & Har-
ris 1999; Talwar & Lee 1999). The researchers told children in the age of 3 - 7
not to touch a toy or not to look in a box during the time they left the room.
The goal was not only to look at what share of pre-school children looked at
the toy but mainly to analyse what is the share of children who lied and then
feigned ignorance. They found that substantial part of children gave misleading
denials of a minor misdemeanor, however they were unskilled in convincingly
feign the ignorance. The results suggest a deception rate increase with age
where 50% of 3-years old children lied about touching the toy whereas by 5-
years old rate grew to 87% (Talwar & Lee 1999).
The thesis of development of moral standards and other-regarding preferences
in the early childhood is in contradiction with the results of Talwar & Lee
(1999). However, the pattern of such development may have deeper roots. Fehr
et al. (2008) argue that according to ethnographic evidence there is a strong
role of egalitarian instincts in human history. Egalitarian concerns could be
favourable features of behaviour from the evolutionary point of view and there
may had been cultural or even genetic transmission. The authors assume that
human egalitarianism and parochialism should develop strongly between the
ages of three and eight. Firstly, children are selfish and then the preference
of removing inequality occurs. The predictions were tested empirically and
confirmed the predictions about development of inequality aversion in early
childhood. The evolutionary aspects have strong implications for dishonesty.
The predictions suggest that dishonest and cheating behaviour prevails by the
youngest children where they mainly focus on their own benefits whereas older
children concern about preferences of others. These predictions are not sup-
ported by evidence from the literature dealing with dishonesty but the develop-
ment of dishonesty with age has been studied just by a few authors and not as
their prime research question. Hence, we try to cope with the question of dif-
ferences between age groups and the results are compared to the evolutionary
predictions in our general discussion of results.
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2.4 Individual vs. group decision making
Groups are mostly in the theoretical economic literature considered as a sin-
gle unit. Economists do not distinguish between behaviour of individuals and
groups, they assume same patterns. However, differences in the decision process
could be neglected by these types of assumptions. From the economical point of
view it could be important to study the group decision making because many
important decisions like public policy or business strategy hinge on groups.
Moreover, an individual interaction is a prerequisite for well functioning social
relationships (Alencar et al. 2008). We constructed three different treatments
to uncover differences in outcomes between individuals and groups in our ex-
periment. Therefore we sketch here a short survey of literature focusing on the
group decision making to show the most important issues and findings in this
area.
Charness & Sutter (2012) summarize the findings from various authors about
what economists have learned about differences between the group and indi-
vidual decision-making. They focus on three main dimensions of differences.
In the first dimension they look at experiments where each player is only con-
cerned with making best selfish decisions. This dimension includes investment
and portfolio decisions or tournaments. In the experimental design it is for in-
stance represented by well-known beauty-contest game. The results show the
quicker convergence of groups to the predictions of standard models and lower
cognitive limitations and biases. The authors conclude it with the statement
that groups are more rational decision makers in the sense that economists have
defined. In the second dimension they convey that groups can help with the
self-control problem and improve productivity. However, it is difficult to study
it in experimental labs, therefore field examples were employed. This thesis is
supported by microfinance, where regular meetings of group members of bor-
rowers help to repay debts. The third and most relevant dimension for our
research stresses, that groups may decrease society welfare because of stronger
self-interested preferences. One piece of evidence is from the prisoner’s dilemma
experiments. Individuals, unlike standard theoretical predictions, often coop-
erate and achieve higher payoff. The rate of cooperation shrinks substantially
when the prisoner’s dilemma is played by groups or even when individuals de-
cides on behalf of the group.
The authors suggest three possible sources of the differences between individ-
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uals and groups: 1) multiple brains are better at seeking answers; 2) multiple
brains are better at anticipating the actions of other parties and thus better at
coordinating behaviour with what other parties are likely to do; and 3) groups
may be more likely than individuals to emphasize monetary payoffs over alter-
native concerns, such as fairness or reciprocity towards another player.
Although this field of research is still emerging, the results suggest the hypoth-
esis that groups behave more self-interested than individuals. This possible
source of differences is of high interest for our research. We adopt this hypoth-
esis and furthermore we explore additional possible differences among different
structures of groups.
To get the complex picture about the group decision making we look into
the psychological research. There was studied experimentally how individuals
behave in groups and how they build strategies for the sake of influencing a
collective decision. Nevertheless, it was typically studied on non-competitive
tasks. Psychologists were interested more in the process of learning. On the
other hand economics is more concerned about outcomes and if these outcomes
are in compliance with the game theoretical predictions. Therefore economists
have begun to test how groups’ decisions differ from individuals’ decisions.
Bosman et al. (2006) sum up factors influencing the group decision making
in their study. They mention 8 factors: the decision problem (what type of
game they play); the decision structure (do individuals decide privately within
a group setting or do they sit together and make a joint decision); the nature of
the other players (individuals or groups); the size of the group; the communi-
cation medium (computer or face-to-face); types of group members; allocation
of types of individuals over groups; the decision rule used by the group (ma-
jority rule or unanimity). Our emphases lay especially on the nature of other
players and types of group members. It means on the factors which are often
overlooked from economists.
We mentioned the receiver-sender experiment by Sutter (2009) in the section
2.2. The sender could pass a message to the receiver in this setting which says
what possibility to choose to get the higher payoff. According to the decision
of the receiver both players were rewarded. However, only the sender knew the
distribution of payoffs from the beginning. Therefore, the sender had motiva-
tions to deceive the receiver in order to maximize her payoff. Receivers and
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senders were in some treatments represented by teams. It allowed to study the
decision process in groups and check the robustness of the individual results.
Firstly, teams were more sceptical than individuals about the rate of following
of sent message by receivers. According to the results receivers indeed followed
messages significantly less often than individuals. Both results showed lower
truthfulness and credibility of teams than of individuals. The second impor-
tant finding was that there was a non-negligible percentage of sophisticated
liars among teams.2 Video tapes with the whole experiment and the whole
decision process were studied thereafter. It was found that right messages were
sent for the sake of confusion of receivers. When the results were adjusted for
the sophisticated lies then individuals and teams did not differ in the deception
rate.
A change in the decision process can be expected also within groups. A small
group of 3 people can have completely different decision process than a large
group of 20 people. Alencar et al. (2008) investigated a cooperation of chil-
dren in the school environment. They were concerned about the impact of the
group size. Children played a public goods game where they could contribute
to a common pot or free-ride. Although they played always individually and
just a number of children contributing to the common pot varied, there can
be explored deceptive patterns. The group size was the only significant factor
influencing the level of contribution. Children cooperated significantly more in
small groups than in large groups. It suggests that there is a weak controlling
mechanism in large groups therefore it is easier to free-ride without any notice
or punishment. Even though we do not deal with the group size in our experi-
mental setting per se, these findings should be kept in mind. To control for the
variation in the group size we have groups of 3 individuals in our experiment
where cooperation should run relatively smoothly.
Cooper & Kagel (2005) compare groups and individuals in terms of the speed
of learning and adjustment. They found faster speed of adjustment by teams.
When a task got more difficult, the gap of speed of learning between indi-
viduals and teams widened. It says that teams play more strategically and
generate positive synergies. However, this type of synergies was revealed only
in strategic tasks like puzzles or mazes. When a task is based on a mechanical
2the explanation can be found in the subsection 2.2 where notion Sophisticated-lie-teller
is explained.
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solution the advantage of teams disappears. It is supported with the evidence
from psychological and economic experiments. Kocher & Sutter (2005) also
found faster learning process of teams in the beauty-contest game. Even there
was no difference in the first round, teams outperformed individuals in latter
rounds. Although our experiment is kind of one shot game (although hidden),
it will be interesting to study if there are synergies and better understanding
of deceptive strategies by teams than by individuals. It is crucial to control for
these kinds of effects in our experiment to gain the level of deception adjusted
for learning and understanding. Therefore the additional variable assessing it




Our experiment is a simple one shot game and our goal is to uncover student’s
cheating behavioural patterns in a natural setting of school. The key element
was not to reveal the real purpose of the experiment in order to get unbiased
and real behavioural patterns. School environment is ideal to achieve this goal.
Students do not feel to be treated differently than usual which is difference to
experimental lab. Moreover, questionnaire surveys take place in schools very
often, therefore students are not suspicious of a new questionnaire (our exper-
iment was presented as a questionnaire survey). The usage of this approach
increases its external validity.1 More than 500 hundred students from gram-
mar schools in the Czech Republic participated in the experiment. Participants
were from grammar schools in Prague and Jihlava. Data collection ran since
autumn of 2012 until February 2013.
The experiment is targeted on students in the first and fourth grade of eight-
year grammar schools (”prima” and ”kvarta” in the Czech educational system).
It includes students of the age 11 - 13 and 14 -16. Reasons for the selection
of these age categories and the type of school are threefold. The first and the
most important is avoiding of selection bias. An exploration of development of
cheating patterns with age is possible only on very similar samples of children.
If we wanted to study the development of cheating on a larger age scale, we
would face the problem that samples on primary schools from the first grade to
1External validity is the general validity of results, mostly from experimental studies, in
the ”real” world.
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the ninth grade are not the same because non-negligible part of children moves
to grammar schools from the fourth and the sixth grade. The problem of selec-
tion bias is avoided when students are taken from the same kind of institution
with the dropout rate close to zero. On the other hand, it limits generaliza-
tion of results on the whole population because grammar school students could
be different from other students of the same age. The second reason is the
applicability of sweets and candies as a payoff where students were paid for a
participation in our experiment with a certain number of sweets. There is a
huge literature discussing an advantage of usage of sweets in experiments with
children. The advantage is that children are not able to understand precisely
the value of money. They understand better the value of sweets. However,
the motivation using sweets is favourable only up to a certain age level. It
basically sets the higher age bound for our experiment because children up to
15 are well motivated with sweets. The last reason was a high learning factor
of grammar school students. That means that we could expect that grammar
school students would understand rules of the experiment properly.
In each class, the experiment was conducted during one school lesson (45 min-
utes). All classes in each school (2 or 4 classes in one school) took part during
the same day, in most cases in lessons directly following each other. The rea-
son was to prevent communication between classes about the content of the
experiment.
3.2 The experiment
As mentioned earlier, our experiment is a simple one shot game using a dice
with a similar approach to Fischbacher & Heusi (2008). However, the whole
process of the experiment employs more complicated structure. For the sake
of not revealing the real purpose of the experiment, students were told to par-
ticipate in the questionnaire survey focusing on environmental protection. The
questionnaire was composed of two parts, where both parts were anonymous.2
In the first part students wrote a few personal characteristics (age, gender or
education of parents). The second part was focused directly on the environmen-
tal protection. Both parts were formulated in a neutral way to avoid framing
2 The original questionnaire and English translation are attached in Appendix B
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effects.3 Furthermore, all experimental sessions were run by one experimenter
for the sake of limiting different treatments of different experimenters.
Firstly, the experimenter read full instructions to students. The important in-
formation regarding the real purpose of the experiment (cheating) was about
payoffs and timing of all tasks. Students were informed that they would be
rewarded for answering the questionnaire. During the experiment they rolled
a six sided dice and according to the number they rolled they received number
of sweets. Their payoff was equal 1,2,3,4 or 5 sweets for corresponding number
on a dice and 0 if they rolled 6. The drop off number 6 as the payoff number
was in order to avoid that subjects act according to gambling heuristics (Fis-
chbacher & Heusi 2008). The rewards included various types of sweets with
similar monetary value (lollipops, chocolates, candies) to meet different prefer-
ences of students and prevent satiation.
After the instruction part students started to fill in questionnaires. Meanwhile,
students were asked to go to the back part of a classroom to roll a dice. After
rolling a dice, they directly wrote a number they rolled/wanted to report into
the box in the questionnaire and came to the experimenter for sweets.
Students were alone in the time of rolling and nobody else could indicate or
control what number they actually rolled. They were also informed in instruc-
tions that not only questionnaires but also rolling a dice is anonymous and
it is impossible to detect retrospectively what an individual rolled. They just
had to show the number written in a box to the experimenter in order to get
sweets. However, the experimenter could not know and observe if the num-
ber written in the questionnaire was the same with the one actually rolled. It
was not mentioned that lying is prohibited and therefore cheating imposed no
additional costs. In the experiment lying means reporting other number than
actually rolled. Although it was impossible to observe lying on the individual
level, cheating and lying patterns could be explored from bigger samples with
the help of statistical and econometrical tools.
3Framing is shifts of preferences or decisions caused by seemingly inconsequential changes
in the formulation of choice problems (Tversky & Kahneman 1981).
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3.3 Treatments and non-experimental data
The previous section laid down general features of the experiment. However,
one of our main research questions was to observe differences between individual
and group decision making. In order to fulfil this goal we designed three dis-
tinct treatments which differed both in the structure and in the questionnaire:
the individual treatment and two group treatments, namely the endogenous
treatment and the exogenous treatment.
3.3.1 Individual treatment
The individual treatment studied individual decision-making. Participants did
all tasks of the experiment alone and communication between participants was
strictly prohibited. The goal was to extract unbiased cheating patterns. Struc-
ture of the experiment was identical to that described in the previous part.
3.3.2 Group treatments
Group decision making is subject to different decision processes than individual
decision making. We wanted to test empirically how much and in which ways
group decision processes about cheating differed from individual decision mak-
ing and if group processing imposed additional costs and burdens for cheating.
Therefore we decided to create additional group treatments. Group decision
making depends also on relationships between its members. This means that
the decision processes can be different for a group of close friends and for ac-
quaintances. That is why we designed two treatments. Groups were formed
either by students in the endogenous treatment, or randomly in the exogenous
treatment.
Endogenous treatment
The endogenous treatment is the first group treatment. The first group treat-
ment is called endogenous because students were supposed to build groups of
three by themselves. When number of children in a classroom was not divisible
by 3, then there was built one or two groups of two. These observations were
then removed from the dataset. The structure of the experiment differed in
several ways from the general setting. After reading the instructions students
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were asked to form groups. Then groups were coming to the experimenter ac-
cording to their speed (groups which were formed first came first) where they
were randomly assigned to a desk in the classroom. It was motivated by split-
ting of two possible effects. The first possible effect was that the fastest formed
groups were groups consisting of close friends. The second possible effect was
an effect of time for decision. Groups rolled a dice in the systematic order.4
Groups going later could discuss a strategy or a possibility of cheating for a
longer period of time.
If then the fastest groups had been assigned according to this order, it would
have been impossible to separate these two effects. This problem is missing
in the individual and in the exogenous treatment because students sit in both
treatments in a classroom randomly.5
The questionnaire was divided into two parts. Students were filling in the first
part individually. Communication and copying was strictly prohibited. After
the first part, where students worked individually, the second part focused on
the environmental protection followed. Students had to cooperate in groups
and had to search for compromises. Rolling of a dice took place during the
second part of the questionnaire and the following method was employed. A
whole group moved to the back part of a classroom where one chosen member
of a group rolled a dice and each member got corresponding number of sweets
for the number reported. The only difference between the individual and both
group treatments from the procedural part was that an individual rolled alone
in the individual treatment whereas the chosen member rolled a dice under
the control of other members of a group in both group treatments. The pro-
cedure was clearly explained at the beginning of the experiment, therefore all
participants knew it in advance. The difference between treatments is that an
individual could decide about cheating until the last moment whilst a group
had to make a strategy or decision about cheating, therefore there were higher
communication and transaction costs of cheating for a group.
4It started from the right row in the front to the back, then middle row and left row last
(from pupils’ view)
5In the individual not completely randomly but cross class order is not dependent on
exact personal characteristics
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Exogenous treatment
In the exogenous treatment students were randomly assigned to groups. It was
carried out with a random draw of numbers from a bag. The structure of the
experiment was then analogical to the endogenous treatment. There was only
a slight difference in the questionnaire which is explained in the 3.3.2
Non-experimental data
We were able to obtain following personal characteristics from all treatments:
gender, age, education of parents, number of siblings (also with division to
brothers and sisters and older and younger siblings) and if parents live to-
gether or separately. The group treatments were extended for questions about
group characteristics indicating how close friends are the group members (best
friends, friends, do not know each other well). The reason behind it was to
get an unbiased relationship network among members and to be able to deter-
mine the composition of each group. There was one additional question in the
exogenous treatment. Students identified how many members of a group they
would change, if they had an opportunity to build another group by themselves.
There was included an additional question after the experiment to 93 indi-
viduals or groups (totally 162 students) determining if they knew about the
possibility of cheating. No matter if they cheated or not. During the whole
experiment the real purpose of the experiment was neither revealed nor ex-
plained to students. Therefore it is be expected that not all students would
realize the possibility of cheating. This was anticipated more among younger
students. Then students who would in other conditions cheat would not cheat
in our experiment because they did not realize this opportunity.
The experimenter asked questions to students about the environmental pro-
tection after the end of the experiment and students could receive additional
sweets if they were able to answer questions correctly. This ”game” enhanced
feeling of the questionnaire research and gave a feedback to students about
their answers. As the last type of a game students were asked to estimate
which numbers on a dice were rolled most often in other grammar schools.
They were asked to write two most frequent numbers among younger students
and two most frequent numbers among older students.6 We were then able to
6Students were not very familiar with the concept of probabilities that is why it was
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construct a dummy variable showing who realized possibility of cheating and
who did not.




There are two main lines for our hypotheses and furthermore, we mark two
benchmarks. The first benchmark behaviour is based on the standard eco-
nomic models. These models predict cheating every time which is profitable
for a subject. There is neither control nor punishment in our experiment which
implies that all people should report number five. Number five is the number
which maximizes subject’s payoff. However, we cannot assume that all stu-
dents realize possibility of cheating in our real setting. Nevertheless, the share
of this high payoff number should be substantial. It should converge to a cer-
tain threshold which is equal 100% minus the share of students who did not
realize possibility of cheating. The second benchmark is a complete honesty. It
is a more hypothetical benchmark. If students had higher utility from telling
the truth, they would always report the actual value and the distribution of
numbers would converge to the uniform distribution as would sample increase
to infinity. We expect results lying between these two extremes. Our research
questions are motivated by other experiments and their predictions as well
as our research questions. Examination of various influences within different
group formations is a completely new approach. Therefore we designed two
distinct treatments on the group formation. Except from the general level of




A) The level of cheating
B) Differences between subgroups
1. Age development
2. Differences between individuals and groups
3. Other characteristics and their possible impacts
The level of cheating
Our goal is not to assess the precise level of cheating. The target is just to
convey patterns of cheating. We thus study where on the scale between two
benchmarks lie our results. We assume that students have a different threshold
for cheating depending on their internal characteristics and external condi-
tions. This hypothesis is supported by the experimental evidence. Fischbacher
& Heusi (2008) found out that individuals do not exploit the whole possibility
of cheating. A certain fraction of participants cheated incompletely and a part
of participants were completely honest. Furthermore, the model of self-concept
maintenance by Mazar et al. (2008) predicts that people cheat up to a point
where they do not consider the level of cheating as bad. It corresponds to
their empirical findings where the level of cheating is not 100% and varies with
exogenous changes.
Age development
Many researchers claim that moral standards and other regarding preferences
develop throughout the early childhood. Fehr et al. (2008) argue that it can be
evolutionary feature. According to the findings of Bauer et al. (2012) or Almås
et al. (2010) children should become less selfish with the age development. This
pattern could hold also for cheating. It would suggest that younger students
should cheat more. Fehr et al. (2008) and Bauer et al. (2012) saw the main
development in the early childhood until the age of 10, whereas Almås et al.
(2010) observed stable level of self-interest among primary school children but
the perception of fairness differed with age. It means that our sample does
not have to capture the age category where the development of other-regarding
preferences takes place.
The effect of knowledge of deceptive strategies goes in the opposite direction.
It was found by Talwar and Lee (2002) that older children understand better
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deceptive strategies. We measure this effect by the variable understood cheat-
ing possibility. Then, there are two effects going against each other and the
overall effect is unclear. Bucciol & Piovesan (2011) found in their experiment
insignificant development of cheating behaviour with age.
Difference between individuals and groups
This has not been studied very often in connection with cheating. There are
just a few exceptions as the research done by Sutter (2009) which we discussed
in the section 2.2 and above all Charness & Sutter (2012). Sutter (2009) found
lower truthfulness and credibility of groups. Charness & Sutter (2012) predict
that groups are more self-interested than individuals. Both results suggest that
groups can better realize deceptive strategies and should cheat more. However,
we argue that also opposite effects are in place in our experimental setting.
Our goal was not to reveal the deceptive feature of the experiment, therefore
decision processing imposes additional transaction and communication costs
and decreases the level of cheating. These costs should be higher for not so
well known friends, therefore we expect higher cheating level in the endogenous
treatment. To sum it up, the aforementioned effects go in opposite directions
and there is not a clear answer for the overall impact.
Other characteristics
Abovementioned hypotheses were the most relevant research questions for our
research. However, we control for a variety of variables which includes personal
characteristics as well as experimental conditions and exogenous factors. Even
if it could not be an exhaustive list by definition, we were able to control for
the most fundamental characteristics and fixed effects. We mention predictions
of variables where there is a possible influence on the level of cheating.
Difference between genders - There is no theory about differences in cheat-
ing between boys and girls. We would have to implicitly assume different moral
standards but it is not supported by the evidence. When we look at field exper-
iments, then Bucciol & Piovesan (2011) did not found any significant gender
effect on the level of cheating.
Education of parents – There could be a linkage between personal back-
ground and honesty. The education of parents could influence moral standards
of children. Bauer et al. (2012) found that children of less educated parents
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are less willing to share in dictator games. The interpretation of these results
in the framework of cheating is following: Children of higher educated parents
could deceive less likely because their moral standards could be higher than
those of lower educated parents.
Number of siblings – The process of decision making and the level of cheat-
ing may hinge on the family background, more specifically on the number of
siblings. Fehr et al. (2008) captured in their experiment that cooperation is
influenced by the structure of siblings. They found strong ”only child” and
”youngest child” effect on sharing. Only children and youngest siblings tend
to share less than other siblings. It may have an effect not only on the level of
cheating but also on the process of communication and cooperation in groups.
Therefore we suspect differences within groups according to the average num-
ber of siblings in a group.
Understood possibility of cheating – The differences in cheating levels
can be caused not only by deliberate decisions about cheating but also by
not realizing possibility to cheat. If a substantial part of students did not
understand this possibility, it would contaminate the results. Furthermore, if
the distribution of students who did not realize this possibility was not similar
across subgroups, the bias would be induced into group comparison. Therefore






Rewards (0 - 5 rewards)
This variable describes number of rewards and also values on a dice reported
by students in the experiment. We used a six-sided dice. The dice variable is
changed into a set of six dummy variables where each dummy variable repre-
sents corresponding number of sweets. Sweets were distributed in the following
manner, 1 up to 5 for a corresponding number on a dice and 0 for the number 6.
High rewards
The variable High rewards is a transformed variable from the original variable
Rewards. It is a dummy variable which equals to 1 when rewards are 3,4 or 5
and 0 when rewards are 0, 1 or 2. The variable is constructed this way because




• Individual treatment - As discussed in previous sections, the individual
treatment is characterised with the individual work during the whole
experiment and especially by rolling a dice.
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• Group treatment - All treatments where students worked and rolled a
dice in a group of 3. This variable is in some regressions further divided
into two treatments.
– Endogenous treatment - Groups were chosen endogenously which
means that students chose by themselves members of their group.
– Exogenous treatment - Groups were matched randomly.
Class
Each class which participated in the experiment has its unique number and the
variable Class is a set of dummy variables where each dummy variable repre-
sents one class.
Faster formed groups
This variable is designed specially for the endogenous treatment. As we men-
tioned in Section 3.3.2, we want to separate the effect of position of a group in a
class and the speed of creation. Therefore groups in the endogenous treatment
were randomly assigned to desks in a class.
Personal characteristics
Age
The experiment was run in first and fourth grades of eight years’ grammar
schools. They are called ”prima” and ”kvarta” in the Czech educational sys-
tem. It includes students of the age 11-13 and 14-16 years. Both first and
fourth grades represent one dummy variable (Younger; Older).
Gender
Individuals - It is divided into two dummy variables (Male and Female).
Groups - The group is denoted as Female if there are at least 2 girls in a group.
Education of parents
The variable Education of parents represents the educational attainment of
parents. The scale of this variable in the questionnaire was 1-5. Number 1
denoted the lowest educational attainment on the scale (primary education)
and number 5 the highest educational attainment (university degree). Then
we constructed one dummy variable for both parents. It is equal to one if the
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educational attainment of both parents is strictly higher than secondary school
education. In case of groups we used the average education of parents for all
group members.
Number of siblings
Individuals - We collected number of siblings and their characteristics for each
individual (their gender, if they are older or younger).
Groups - We have the same set of information for each member of a group.
However, we constructed proxies for analysis of groups - number of siblings is
represented by the average number of siblings in a group.
Group composition
Group composition is a set of 4 dummy variables which expresses gender com-
position of a group where each dummy variable expresses number of girls in a
group. The variable 0 female goes up in value 1 when a group is composed by
3 boys and 0 girls and 3 females is equal to 1 when a group is composed by 3
girls and 0 boys.
Friends
The friends variable is an index constructed from answers to questions about
the relationships within the group. We asked them how good friends with other
members of a group they are (best friends, friends, do not know each other well)
and how many group members they would change if they were allowed to build
a group by themselves in the exogenous treatment. We constructed the index
ranging from 1 to 3 where 3 stands for a group composed from very close friends
and 1 from members who do not know each other well.
Understood cheating possibility
Variable Understood cheating possibility was measured just for a fraction of
the dataset and totally includes 93 observations. As discussed in Section 3.3.2
this variable was collected after the experiment and students were guessing
what numbers students in other grammar schools rolled. We then constructed
a dummy variable according to the following procedure: If their guess was




The econometrical analysis uses the bivariate probit model. The bivariate
probit model is a non-linear estimation where a dependent variable has only
two values - 0 or 1. The non-linearity does not allow the estimation with the
usage of the ordinary least squares (OLS) procedure but employs the maximal
likelihood (MLE) procedure. The general form of the probit model (Wooldridge
2009) is expressed as:
P (y = 1 | x) = G(β0 + xβ)
where G is a function with the range: 0 < G(z) < 1 ∀z ∈ <. Matrix xβ
expresses estimations of all explanatory variables xβ = x1β1 + x2β2 + . . . +
xkβk. G is in the probit regression a standard normal cumulative distribution
function, which can be expressed as follows:











The estimations are of two types. The first type is the regression of a single
dependent variable which equals 1 when high reward value was reported and
0 when low value was reported. The second type is a series of six univariate
dummy regressions where each regression represents one unit of reward. Each
of six dependent variable equals 1 when given payoff value was reported and 0
otherwise.









These coefficients are interpreted as the changes of probability by the ex-
planatory variable changes by one unit when keeping other variables constant.
Dummy variables are interpreted the same.
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5.2.1 Robustness check
The robustness check serves as a control of results determined from the bivariate
probit estimations. The robustness check regressions use other econometrical
method, namely multinomial logit. Multinomial logistic regression is a simple
extension of the bivariate logistic regression where dependent variable is al-
lowed to range for more than just two values. Multinomial logistic regression
uses maximum likelihood estimation, same as bivariate logistic regression. The
logistic coefficient for each independent variable for each category of the depen-
dent variable (except for the base category) expresses the expected amount of
change in the logit for each one unit change in the independent variable. The
logit is the odds of membership in the category of the dependent variable which
has been specified. The closer the coefficient is to zero, the smaller influence
the explanatory variable has in predicting the logit. The base categories for the
dependent variables are: 0 for the variable High rewards and 3 for the variable
Rewards. The coefficients of the multinomial regressions do not allow direct
comparison with the bivariate regressions, therefore the aim is not to assess
precise differentials of bivariate and multinomial estimations but the aim is the
qualitative comparison of the results from both types of models.
5.2.2 Randomization and multicollinearity check
The assumption check consists from two elements. Firstly, we have to deter-
mine if observations are randomly distributed across treatments. We compare
means of all explanatory variables and we then test the hypothesis that their
means in all tretments are the same. The comparison is firstly executed for the
individual and the group treatment and means are tested with the t-test. Then
the group treatment is split into the endogenous and exogenous treatment and
all three treatments are again tested together with a use of the F-test.
The results presented in Appendix One in Table A.9 show that we cannot reject
the hypothesis of the same means for the variables - older, female and number
of siblings. The only variable assigning bias is the variable education of parents.
In that case we can reject the hypothesis that means are equally distributed.
However, this variable is a dummy variable which equals 1 when both parents
have higher than secondary school education. When we separate education of
father and education of mother and let the whole range (1 up to 5), the bias in
one case disappears (0.36 and 0.44) and in the other becomes weak (0.04 and
0.11). Therefore we can conclude that even with a weak bias in the variable
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education of parents, populations in all treatments are statistically equal.
Secondly, we analyse correlations among explanatory variables. Results can be
found in Table A.10 in Appendix One. Correlations among variables appear to
be very weak and therefore cannot cause multicollinearity in regressions. We
can conclude that assumptions are satisfied and results are not biased.
Chapter 6
Results
In this chapter we present main results obtained from the experiment. The
chapter is arranged into four main sections. In the first section we discuss
cheating patterns in the two values setting. Firstly, the whole sample is dis-
cussed, then the dataset is divided into four subsamples. We compare reported
rewards with the random draw which is followed by the econometrical analysis.
The second section uses same tools but extends the analysis for all six values of
rewards. Section 6.3 presents impacts of additional variables and the robust-
ness check is included in the last section.
6.1 Two values analysis
6.1.1 Whole sample
The dataset involves 226 observations. We omit the differentiation between
individuals and groups for this moment and we focus on exploration of be-
havioural features of the whole sample. Figure 6.1 identifies shares of reported
rewards among all participants. The high reward variable is composed from 3,
4 and 5 rewards, where 5 rewards is the maximal number of rewards that could
be obtained. The low reward variable includes 0, 1 and 2 rewards. The first
chart depicts that almost 70% of all participants reported high reward num-
bers. Asterisks behind the shares label the significance of shares when they
are different from the random draw. The random draw means the uniform
distribution of all values. In this case we can observe that both shares differ
from 50% on 1% level of significance. It suggests that some fraction of students
reported other number than rolled. We can therefore assume that some part
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of students cheated.
Figure 6.1: High and low reward distribution
*=10% – level, **=5% – level, ***= 1% – level of significance that share is not
equal to the random draw
However, the differentiation from the random draw is only an approximate
measure and we utilize the analysis of all six reward values for further details.
Figure 6.2 reveals the distribution of rewards in the sample. There is a clear
cut between low and high payoffs. In this case the share of 16.67% represents
the uniform distribution. Figure indicates that the shares of all levels of
Figure 6.2: Distribution of rewards
*=10% – level, **=5% – level, ***= 1% – level of significance that share is not
equal to the random draw
rewards are not equal to the random draw on at least 5% level of significance.
In other words, values are skewed to high payoff numbers. It supports the
thesis that a certain fraction of students cheated. Second important feature
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is that high level payoffs have similar representation and number 4 has even
the largest proportion. It suggests that students did not exploit the maximal
possibility of cheating.
To sum this section up, the substantial fraction of students cheated. It is sup-
ported by the dummy variable analysis as well as by the analysis of the whole
range. However, students often did not use the maximal possibility of cheating
and reported other number of rewards than rolled but not the maximal.
6.1.2 Comparison of subsamples
This section targets on the development with age and on the impact of increas-
ing number of decision makers on the cheating level. Therefore, we separate the
dataset into younger and older and into individuals and groups. Afterwards, we
go deeper in the analysis and we try to combine abovementioned separations
into one. Target groups look as follows: younger individuals, younger groups,
older individuals and older groups. It enables us to precisely disentangle the
impact of age and group decision making on cheating.
Firstly, we simply look at the dice distribution in two main categories we are
interested in. Shares of both individuals and groups are significantly different
from 50% on 1% level of significance which can be observed in Figure 6.3. The
share is slightly higher for groups but the differential is less than 5%. Bigger
differential is between younger and older students. The shares are also signifi-
cantly different from 50% but the gap between these two groups is almost 14%.
It suggests that older students cheat more than younger and that there is not a
big difference between individuals and groups. However, this analysis gives just
a partial answer to the cheating patterns and could not reveal the differentials
within groups. Therefore we extend the analysis into four subsamples - younger
individuals, younger groups, older individuals and older groups which enables
us to understand better the cheating patterns of each particular subsample.
Table 6.1 reveals average number of rewards in those four categories. The high-
est average reward is in the category older individuals but other categories do
not differ substantially. The only exception is the category younger individuals
where the average reward is 2.53 which is by about 0.7 reward lower than by
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Figure 6.3: High reward distribution comparison
*=10% – level, **=5% – level, ***= 1% – level of significance that share is not
equal to the random draw
other categories.
Table 6.1: Average reward
Category Obs. Avg. reward
Younger individuals 57 2.53
Younger groups 57 3.32
Older individuals 60 3.32
Older Groups 52 3.23
Obs. - Number of observations
The shares of high rewards are depicted in Figure 6.4. It is supplemented by
the two sample test of proportions which can be seen in Table 6.2. The hypoth-
esis that the share is equal to 50% is rejected with the exception for younger
individuals. The other subsamples are significantly different from the random
draw on the 1% level of significance.
The age development and differentials in the decision making can be read from
Figure 6.4. The high payoffs are more frequent in the older category. It would
suggest that older students tend to cheat more. Nevertheless, this picture
would be too simplified. There is also a strong dissimilarity between the in-
dividual and the group decision making, therefore the discrepancies have to
be studied in both dimensions. The graph displays that younger students are
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Figure 6.4: High reward distribution for subgroups
*=10% – level, **=5% – level, ***= 1% – level of significance that share is not
equal to the random draw
not a homogenous group and their level of cheating differs according to the
treatment. The first result about cheating patterns is that younger students
cheat more likely in groups. The two-sample mean-comparison test for older
category shows that the treatment does not have any significant impact on the
cheating level.
Table 6.2: Comparison of subgroups
Subgroup comparison
p–value
younger individuals vs. older individuals 0.17%***
younger groups vs. older groups 92.85%
younger individuals vs. younger groups 3.35%**
older individuals vs. older groups 38.15%
(*=10%- level, **=5%-level, ***= 1%-level
of significance that the subgroups have
the same average)
We can generally state that there is a big difference between younger and
older individuals whereas there is a similar expected level of cheating for younger
and older groups.
6.1.3 Econometrical analysis
The analysis lingers on examination of four different subsamples and the results
are presented in Table 6.3. We could detach the effect of age and the effect
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of group on the decision making. We focus more on qualitative interpretation
of the results than on exact quantification of cheating levels. The probability
change in the upper part of Table 6.3 symbolizes the change from younger to
older students and in the bottom part the probability change from individuals
to groups.















p-value - *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1, + p< 0.15
Notes: dependent variable - High rewards, explanatory
variables cumulatively for all regressions: Age, gender,
treatment, number of siblings, education of parents,
number of siblings, education of parents, class fixed effects,
group composition, group relationships; coefficients
represent probability differentials of high reward -
in the upper part between younger and older category
and the bottom part between individuals and groups
full regressions can be found in Appendix One,
Tables A.1, A.2, A.3, A.4,A.5
There are similar patterns which were observed from Figures 6.1, 6.2 and 6.4.
The overall level of cheating is higher in the older subsample. The probability of
high rewards is about 29.3% higher by older students. Although the probability
does not represent exactly the level of cheating, we can suppose that substantial
part of the difference is directly caused by cheating. More importantly, the
evidence verifies higher level of cheating of older than younger individuals and
no significance between groups. It resembles with the results from previous
parts.
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The relationship of number of decision-makers and level of cheating is weaker
than it seemed to be in the statistical part. The conclusion from the statistical
analysis was that younger students tended to cheat more in groups and older
students cheated more likely individually. It is not fully endorsed here. There
is about 21% higher probability on the 5% level of significance that younger
students cheat more in groups. On the other hand the differential disappears
after controlling for fixed effects which could be found in Appendix One, Table
A.4 and Table A.5. It could be caused by low number of treatment classes
which leads to low variation. Furthermore, the difference among older students
is insignificant.
6.2 Six values analysis
We begin our analysis with an inspection of four charts portraying shares of all
six rewards. It extends the two values (high and low reward) analysis. Figure
6.5 characterizes the distribution of rewards among students in four subgroups
– young individuals, young groups, old individuals and old groups.
Figure 6.5: Reward distribution in four subgroups
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Younger individuals
The subgroup of younger individuals is the most specific subgroup. The distri-
bution of rewards is not significantly different from the random draw. All other
subgroups have at least one value with disproportionate representation. It is
interpreted in the way that younger individuals probably did not cheated in a
significant way. Surprisingly, the largest share has 0 rewards which supports
the hypothesis of honesty of this category.
Younger groups
The distribution of rewards is skewed towards high reward values. 0 rewards
value is represented by only 1.75% share. Higher values are spread into more
values. The most frequent among high value numbers and the only significantly
different from the random draw is value representing 4 rewards (28.07%). It
suggests that younger students cheat but do not exploit whole possibility of
cheating. It exhibits similar patterns as in the two value setting.
Older individuals
Values vary significantly from the random draw. The largest share have number
3 (35.09%) and then 4 (29.82%). There are only two insignificant values - 2
and 5. High level of cheating and relatively low representation of maximal
reward (19.30%) shows aversion of being perceived as liar. Nevertheless, it
again indicates the tendency for incomplete cheating.
Older groups
Although the distribution pattern in the two values setting was very similar
for older and younger groups, the situation changes in the six values setting.
Older groups have the largest share of maximal reward number 5 (30.77%). It
is the only value different from random draw on 1% level of significance. It
is worth noting that older groups exploit predominantly maximal possibility
of cheating. It distinguishes older and younger groups from each other. Even
though both subgroups seemed very similar in two values setting, the extended
analysis brought new insight and detected important dissimilarities. Younger
groups used probably more often incomplete cheating whereas older groups
cheated more likely maximally.
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6.2.1 Econometrical analysis
The econometrical analysis keeps same setting as employed in subsection 6.1.3
but it is extended to six values in Table 6.4.
Table 6.4: Six reward regression – Age development and impact of
groups
0 reward 1 rewards 2 rewards 3 rewards 4 rewards 5 rewards
Age development
whole sample
-0.150*** -0.0369 -0.0587 0.141* 0.134+ 0.0144
(0.00272) (0.534) (0.296) (0.0698) (0.105) (0.861)
individual treatment
-0.179*** -0.0151 -0.0671 0.158* 0.113 -0.00381
(0.00413) (0.761) (0.296) (0.0582) (0.157) (0.958)
group treatment
0.0783** -0.0102 -0.0676 0.0277 -0.0977 0.0471
(0.0444) (0.895) (0.390) (0.726) (0.245) (0.590)
Impact of groups
younger students
-0.231*** 0.0693 -0.0247 0.0436 0.100 0.0480
(0.000922) (0.273) (0.701) (0.569) (0.212) (0.558)
older students
0.0639 0.0325 -0.0334 -0.154+ -0.00699 0.0772
(0.203) (0.529) (0.580) (0.101) (0.940) (0.387)
p-value - *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1, + p< 0.15
Notes: dependent variable - Rewards, explanatory variables cumulatively
for all regressions: Age, gender,treatment, number of siblings, education
of parents, number of siblings, education of parents, class fixed effects,
group composition, group relationships; coefficients represent probability
differentials of given rewards - in the upper part between younger and
older category and the bottom part between individuals and groups, full
regressions can be found in Appendix One,Tables A.1, A.2, A.3, A.4, A.5
The results confirm the hypotheses stated in the previous part. The com-
position of values between younger and older students shows higher cheating
patterns in the older category. Older have 15% lower probability of reporting
0 rewards and 13-14% higher probability of reporting 3 or 4.
Higher level of cheating of older than of younger individuals is verified in the
second line of Table 6.4. On the other hand, the gap between both treatments
in the two values setting was wider. The group treatment results testify that
younger and older groups are not the same and their composition of shares is
dissimilar, but the overall level of cheating is similar in both categories.
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The emphases were put more on an exploration of younger category. The re-
sults are in the bottom part of Table 6.4. It shows similar patterns as two
values econometrical analysis. There is a higher probability of 0 rewards, at
level reaching 23%, for older individuals, nevertheless other values are insignif-
icant. It can be expected that cheating in groups probably prevailed from 0
rewards to higher number of rewards. Furthermore, the difference disappears
in the fixed effects regression. As we discussed previously, the dismissal of
significance can be caused by low number of classes in both treatments.
6.3 Further results
Further investigation is targeted on hypotheses mentioned in Chapter 4. They
described possible impacts of other characteristics as family background, ex-
ternal influences and others. Then the effect of understanding possibility of
cheating is investigated. This inquiry is of high relevance because it helps us
to shed light on motivations behind cheating.
Difference between endogenous and exogenous treatment
Even though the decision making of individuals and groups was broadly ad-
dressed in the previous section, one part was omitted. The group treatment was
formed from two distinct treatments – endogenous and exogenous treatment.
It was motivated by the expectation that cooperation between members of ex-
ogenous groups would be impeded in comparison within endogenous groups. It
is supposed that exogenously built groups in a class have weaker connections.
The results show the opposite. The way of building of groups has no influence
Table 6.5: Differences between Exogenous and Endogenous treatment
High rewards 0 reward 1 rewards 2 rewards 3 rewards 4 rewards 5 rewards
-0.121 0.0434 0.0245 0.0712 -0.134 0.00964 0.0375
(0.302) (0.283) (0.797) (0.537) (0.175) (0.926) (0.728)
p-value - *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1, + p< 0.15
Notes: dependent variable - High rewards and Rewards, explanatory variables: Age, Group
composition, number of siblings, education of parents, group relationships, class fixed
effects; coefficients represent probability regressions of given reward between endogenous
and exogenous treatment, full regressions can be found in Appendix One,Table A.3
on the decision making about cheating. It is also supported by the variable
Friends representing the interconnections within a group which proved to be
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insignificant. It means that neither way of building group nor inner relation-
ships within groups had a substantial impact on cheating decision of students.
Final remark focuses on the endogenous treatment. Data collected on this
treatment includes more specific variables about relationships within a group.
Other treatments did not allow controlling for the speed of formation and the
proximity of relationships. However, both effects turned to be insignificant.
Proximity of relationship had a minor impact on decisions about reported num-
bers which is not robust and furthermore disappears when we control for fixed
effects. The regressions with coefficients are involved in Table A.6 in Appendix
One.
Differences between genders
Even though there is no complex theory describing the cheating patterns of
males and females, we analyze gender differentials in our experiment. The
whole sample regression uses a proxy for groups. The variable equals one
whenever two or more girls are in a group. The group regression analyses the
whole gender composition as a series of dummy variables.
Weak relationship between gender and level of cheating occurs in the whole
sample regression. There is 7% higher probability that girls report one reward
and 8% lower probability of two rewards. Nevertheless, there is a lack of robust-
ness of gender disproportions and significant results go in opposite directions.
Therefore we can state that gender did not have considerable impact.
Education of parents
Although experimental economics has brought large evidence that children of
highly educated parents behave differently than children of less educated par-
ents and that there could be a linkage between education and honesty, the data
indicate the opposite. There is no robust correlation and therefore the overall
level of honesty does not depend on the consequence if a student comes from
high or low educated family background.
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Number of siblings
Number of siblings could possibly form the willingness for cooperation during
childhood. Fehr et al. (2008) found that only children share their resources less
than children with siblings. There is a suspicion that the size of the family
could have an impact on level of honesty.
Table 6.6: Impact of number of siblings
High rewards 0 reward 1 rewards 2 rewards 3 rewards 4 rewards 5 rewards
Whole sample
-0.0687+ 0.0124 0.0197 0.0280 0.00941 -0.00353 -0.0832*
(0.121) (0.576) (0.478) (0.328) (0.802) (0.927) (0.0562)
Individual treatment
0.00363 -0.0103 -0.0167 0.0195 -0.00308 0.0371 -0.0450
(0.949) (0.769) (0.604) (0.608) (0.948) (0.392) (0.326)
Group treatment
-0.241*** 0.0415* 0.103+ 0.0957 0.0432 -0.155* -0.175*
(0.00399) (0.0892) (0.111) (0.182) (0.516) (0.0714) (0.0653)
p-value - *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1, + p< 0.15
Notes: dependent variable - High rewards and Rewards, explanatory variables cumulatively
for all regressions: Age, gender,treatment, number of siblings, education of parents,
number of siblings, education of parents, class fixed effects, group composition,
group relationships; coefficients represent probability coefficients represent probability
change of given reward with additional one sibling, full regressions an be found in
Appendix One,Table A.1, A.2 and A.3
Table 6.6 gives the coefficients for the impact of number of siblings on the
shares of dice numbers which is also a good proxy for level of cheating. There
is a small visible influence in the whole sample but this influence disappears in
the individual treatment. However, the group treatment exhibits consistent and
significant results that groups with on average more siblings cheat less. There is
approximately 18% lower probability that a group reports maximal amount of
rewards when each member of group has on average one more sibling. In the two
value setting it makes even 24% lower probability on the 1% significance level.
Nevertheless, we deal with the interpretation more in the following chapter.
Understood the cheating possibility
The main question needed to answer is whether some subgroup of students
knew better about the possibility of cheating and whether it caused significant
differences in the results. It would mean that it was not just honesty which
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played a role in the decision making about reporting other number than rolled.
This variable was collected only from a fraction of students participating in the
experiment. Low number of observations enabled only two values regression –
high and low reward. The results from this part are included in Appendix One,
Table A.7.
The variable is significant in the whole sample on the level 5-10%. It shows
20% higher probability that students who understood the cheating possibility
reported high reward numbers more. When we split the sample into subgroups
it turns out that the variable is significant in the younger subsample. The
difference in probabilities is substantial; around 30% higher for students un-
derstood the cheating possibility.
The second step is to address if the control for the cheating possibility vari-
able results in the change of magnitudes of other variables. The regression was
executed only on the part of the whole sample, therefore we cannot simply
generalize the results but we can expect similar behavioural patterns. There
is an anticipation of similar qualitative impacts in the general setting. The
comparison shows interesting patterns. The regressions uncover persisting dif-
ferential in the level of cheating between younger and older students even when
controlled for the understanding of cheating possibility. The differentials de-
creased but just mildly, in the whole sample and in the individual sample just
about a few percent. It means that a certain fraction did not realize possibility
of cheating, on the other hand there is still robust difference between honesty of
younger and older students. The second important finding is a disappearance of
differential between younger individuals and groups. The results suggest that
younger individuals were more unable to detect the cheating opportunity. The
controlled regression reveals that cheating patterns and level of honesty among
younger students does not have to differ between individuals and groups. We
are very cautious in generalization for the whole sample, however there is a
probability that the same patterns may hold for the whole dataset.
In the last step we regressed the variable understood possibility of cheating
on the other explanatory variable. The results can be found in Appendix
One, Table A.8. We found that only age is the significant predictor for the
understanding of cheating. Older student probably learned more during their
lifespan deceptive strategies and are more able to detect them in the real life
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situations. Neither family background, nor external factors have a significant
impact on understanding of cheating possibility.
6.4 Robustness check
The last part of this chapter involves the robustness check which, as the name
suggests, examines the power and the robustness of the results. The variation
of an estimation method should not lead to significantly different results from
the original method. Tables summarizing the results from the multinomial logit
estimations can be found in Appendix One, Tables A.11, A.12, A.13, A.14 and
A.15.
The whole sample regressions resemble in most parts with the bivariate probit
estimations. We focus on the two values analysis first. The significant vari-
ables are the same in both regressions – Older, Female, Group treatment and
Number of siblings; and the coefficients have qualitatively same signs. What
is more, the relative magnitudes of the coefficients in the multinomial logistic
regression correspond to the original results. Extension of the analysis for all
six values comes to similar patterns from both estimations. The strongest im-
pact of explanatory variables is on the 0 reward level.
The division of the dataset into four subsamples does not lead to a diverse con-
clusion. The only explanatory variable with the significant impact on the dice
distribution in the individual treatment is the age and the number of siblings
for the group treatment. The two setting regressions for the younger category
preserve the significance of the difference between individuals and groups, boys
and girls and last but not least number of siblings. The dice distribution in
the older category is not affected by the explanatory variables as well as in the
bivariate regressions.
To sum it up, the results from the robustness check are very similar to those
obtained in the bivariate probit regressions. This statement is confirmed not
only by significance and signs but also by the relative magnitudes of the coeffi-
cients. Therefore the results are robust and estimation method do not influence
findings from the experiment. We can assume that impacts of the explanatory
variables on the cheating levels are independent of estimation method.
Chapter 7
Discussion – Links to theories
This chapter addresses the nature of cheating and discusses why people some-
times abstain from lying. The empirical analysis is focused on grammar school
students, therefore the generalization on larger population is at least prob-
lematic. We employ several models from previous sections including standard
economic theory, maintaining of self-concept emphasised by Mazar et al. (2008)
or Fischbacher & Heusi (2008) or lie aversion proclaimed also by Fischbacher
& Heusi (2008). In the next section alternative explanations are analysed and
differences between individuals and groups are incorporated.
In order to further explore robust cheating patterns obtained from the experi-
ment we conclude main empirical results first. There are four major empirical
findings. Firstly, a certain fraction of students cheated but did not exploit
the whole possibility of cheating. In other words, they cheated incompletely.
Secondly, younger students cheated more likely in groups. The hypothesis that
older students cheated more likely individually was not approved. Thirdly,
older students cheated more often than younger students. However, the biggest
difference is caused by low level of cheating of younger individuals. There is a
robust pattern that groups with on average more siblings behaved more hon-
estly than groups which had on average lower number of siblings. Fourthly,
younger students did realize the possibility of cheating in smaller extend than
their older counterparts. Therefore there is a possibility that variation among
younger students is caused by not realizing the cheating opportunity.
7. Discussion – Links to theories 49
7.1 Standard economic theory and complete hon-
esty
At the beginning of Chapter 4, two benchmark scenarios were set, namely to-
tal dishonesty and maximal honesty. The first scenario is the prediction of the
standard economic theory where individuals maximize their payoff in the set-
ting of no control and no punishment. This pure economic theory is however
rejected in our experiment. According to the predictions of this scenario the
vast majority should cheat maximally. However, the dice distribution in the
whole sample and also in other subsamples rejects these predictions. Further-
more, the distribution of the subsample of young individuals is not significantly
different from the random draw.
The other scenario is a more theoretical benchmark. Complete honesty is
condemned with the results both on the whole sample level and on subsample
levels. The only exception is the subsample younger individuals where the
hypothesis of random distribution of reward values was not rejected. Therefore
the non-cheating hypothesis cannot be repudiated.
This type of models cannot clarify the observed cheating patterns including
incomplete cheating. Therefore, we turn to a different line of explanations
and arguments. Next step is to face empirical results with predictions of the
self-concept theory.
7.2 Maintaining a favourable self-concept
The model of self-concept maintenance is built on the idea that people want
to be perceived as moral and generous. It is not only the will of people to be
perceived from others as good and honest but also by themselves. It suggests
that people will cheat up to the level to keep their self-concept and integrity.
It could be rephrased that people will cheat just up to the level which is not
considered by themselves and others as immoral. What traits of the model are
relevant for our experiment and what are the predictions?
Individuals want to avoid being seen in their eyes as greedy or dishonest when
considering cheating. The external influences were in our experimental setting
diminished whereas mainly the internal influences were in the force. In order to
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keep their self-concept subjects can decide to report other number than rolled
but not the maximal reward number. They can report 3 or 4 instead of 2
without regarding it as bad. This is a very important element of the model
because it explains incomplete cheating. Even though the external influences
were suppressed by the experimenters, they could possibly play a minor role.
Students had to show the reported number to the experimenter. Moreover,
students could possibly see number of rewards of their classmates. Therefore,
if a student reports 4 instead of 5, there is a lower probability to be seen as a
liar by other classmates. Individuals could incorporate this element into their
decision process about cheating. It could also contribute to the incomplete
cheating phenomenon. It has to be noted that our empirical findings support
the predictions of self-concept at least on the individual level. Moreover, the
results are in accordance with the results of Fischbacher & Heusi (2008) who
found similar patterns of incomplete cheating which the authors attributed
mainly to the self-concept maintenance.
The maintenance of self-concept considers subjects as individual units. It is
not constructed for groups and it lacks the motivation within the framework of
more complex decision process. Even though, the model has no extension for
group decision making, we try to build upon it to determine possible predic-
tions. Interactions with other members of a team may increase the burden for
cheating because they want to be seen by other members as nice and honest.
Therefore it could lead to disguising of cheating strategies and lower level of
cheating groups. This line of argumentation leads to the same implications as
the argument that group decision process imposes additional costs on commu-
nication. The results do not support these predictions. Groups cheat slightly
more in the whole sample or similarly when controlling for understanding of
cheating possibility. However, the variation in the whole sample is mainly
driven by the differential between younger individuals and younger groups.
Another way of understanding the model could be that students may cheat
more in groups because they do not feel responsible for the decision of a group
and therefore they would not harm their self-concept by cheating. It would
imply opposite directions, namely higher level of cheating in groups. These
two directions could offset each other, therefore the overall effect is not totally
clear.
We are aware that group predictions are our interpretation of the model which
do not necessarily represent the interpretation of the authors. The important
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fact is that there seems to be non-negligible difference between individual and
group decision processes. Although the model explains the data well on the
individual level, it fails on the group level. The extension of the model for
group underpinnings would probably help to reveal motivations and nature of
lies in the more complex decision setting.
7.3 Lie aversion
The main assumption of the model as mentioned in Fischbacher & Heusi (2008)
is a disutility from lying. Basically, people want to stay honest. However, the
level and magnitude of disutility differs across individuals. Dishonesty or cheat-
ing then depends on the result of cost-benefit analysis in which an individual
compares the utility from cheating and the disutility from lying. Various utility
and disutility functions mean that for a certain fraction of people is cheating
beneficial and the rest profits from remaining honest. It entails monotonously
lying patterns with stakes. The model lacks explanation of incomplete cheat-
ing. There are always just two parts of population - one cheats completely and
the other is honest.
The results do not support the theoretical predictions. As observed from Figure
6.5 and Table 6.4, there is a robust fraction of so called incomplete liars. The
nature of lying has therefore probably other explanation than expressed in
the lie aversion model. This model basically does not fit the data from our
experiment, the major dissimilarity is the inability to predict incomplete lying.
7.4 Development of other-regarding preferences
Alternative line of argumentation uses findings from experimental economics
and evolutionary theories. Bauer et al. (2012), Alm̊as et al. (2010) or Fehr et al.
(2008) argue that other-regarding preferences develop during the childhood.
There could not be just a linkage between age development and selfishness but
also between age development and honesty. It would imply that children learn
not to cheat and not to be selfish during their childhood. It would result in
higher cheating patterns in younger categories. Second, Fehr et al. (2008) found
the development of parochialism in the childhood. It means that children in
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groups should be more concerned about the payoff of their own group. The
level of cheating should be then higher for older groups with comparison of
younger groups and also to older individuals.
The empirical findings reveal contradictory patterns. There is an increasing
level of cheating with the age and it sustains even after the control for the
variation connected with understanding of cheating possibility. Moreover, the
level of cheating of older groups is not significantly higher than younger groups
or older individuals. The detailed results are depicted in Appendix One, Tables
A.1, A.2 and A.3. The reason which was also discussed in Section 2.3 could
be the usage of age categories. We ran our experiment on students of the age
11–15 whereas the authors assume the major part of the development of other-
regarding preferences in the range of 3–10. This condition does not enable us
to reject their propositions. The future extension of the experiment should
go in the direction of widening age groups in order to capture development of
other-regarding preferences.
7.5 Groups and cheating
The evidence from various authors suggests disparity in decisions and moti-
vations when compared individuals with groups. Charness & Sutter (2012)
quote that groups are more sophisticated decision makers and are more self-
interested. The reasons may include better common knowledge within a group
or that group members are concerned not only about their payoff but also about
the payoff of their counterparts which decreases concerns about payoffs of sub-
jects outside a group. These findings are highly relevant for our experiment
because they predict higher level of cheating for groups.
The impacts of groups on the level of cheating are dubious. There is clearly a
higher cheating pattern for groups in the younger category as seen in Table A.4.
However, this pattern vanishes when we control for understanding of cheating
possibility. Therefore, we cannot completely reject the hypothesis that the
variation between these two subgroups is caused by unfamiliarity of younger
individuals. The older category indicates insignificance of difference between
individuals and groups. However, there is a higher proportion of maximal
number rewards by older groups. Older individuals exhibit higher share of
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number 3 and 4. It suggests that groups could be more self-interested than
individuals, nevertheless the effect is not strong enough to be totally convincing.
On the other hand, a broader difference is observed in motivations of individ-
uals and groups. The importance of the age is lower and number of siblings
may play a bigger role in the group treatment. It suggests differences in the
decision process between individuals and groups.
The last result, which has not been discussed yet, is the impact of number of
siblings on the level of cheating within groups. It has not been explored in
the cheating experiments yet. The only evidence by Fehr et al. (2008) sug-
gest a significant ”only child” and ”youngest child” effect on sharing. Our
analysis revealed that groups with on average higher number of siblings cheat
less. The explanation of this finding is not discussed in the literature, there-
fore we propose our clarification. Students with higher number of siblings are
more often faced with interactions with more subjects (siblings) and may be
more aware about benefits of honest behaviour. However, the counterargument
is that they are probably more skilled in detection and creation of deceptive
strategies, therefore they should cheat more. These two opposite effects give
no clear explanation for the discovered empirical pattern.
Our results support the classical predictions of group experiments just in the
limited scale. Nevertheless, the experiments has been never done in the field
of cheating before. The decision making about cheating seems to come under
different processes and motivations that is why the research in this field needs
further theoretical and empirical exploration.
The conclusion of this chapter investigating interpretation of the results can be
divided into two main parts. Firstly, the model of maintenance of self-concept
fits the data best. It involves a fraction of incomplete liars which is supported
by the results. Subjects then cheat up to the level to keep their self-concept
in order to remain nice and honest people in their eyes and also in the eyes
of others. However, this model lacks of the differentiation between individuals
and groups which curtails the generalization for the whole sample. The second
conclusion is that further theoretical research of the differences of cheating
patterns between individuals and groups is needed to better understand and
capture motivations and sources of decisions.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
Cheating and deception are widespread phenomena and children’s behaviour
is not the exception. Then we have to ask about the extent and motivations.
How much do children cheat? If they cheat more in groups or individually or if
older children deceive more frequently and are more skilled in deceptive strate-
gies than their younger counterparts? These questions are also relevant with
respect to economic theory. The standard economic theory predicts dishonesty
in every situation profitable for an individual. If we determine other empirical
patterns we have to discuss other models describing behaviour of children.
We presented the simple experiment with children in the age category 11 – 16
years. They rolled a dice as an instrument of payoff for time spent filling in not
related questionnaire and were rewarded with number of sweets for correspond-
ing number on a dice. Because of no control setting they could report whatever
number they wanted. We were then able to assess cheating patterns of different
subgroups and the impact of various external factors and family background.
The main focus was on the development of dishonesty features with age and
on differences between individual and group decision making. Summing up
the experiment revealed following patterns: 1) A certain fraction of students
cheated but a substantial part did not use the whole possibility of cheating; 2)
Younger students cheated more likely in groups than as individuals; 3) Older
students cheated more frequently than younger students, however some part of
differential could be explained by higher knowledge of deceptive strategies of
older students; 4) There is a non-negligible effect that groups with on average
more sibling behaved more honestly than groups with on average fewer siblings.
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The empirical findings contradict the predictions of the standard economic
theory. The standard theory cannot explain a fraction of incomplete liars who
cheat but instead of maximal reward 5 report 4 or 3. Furthermore, the cost
benefit analysis under no control and no punishment indicates that dishonesty
should be profitable therefore the predictions suggest that the cheating level
should be 100% or very close to it. Maintaining a favourable self-concept de-
scribes obtained cheating patterns more precisely. It assumes that people want
to stay honest in their eyes and in the eyes of others like classmates or experi-
menters. Therefore a certain portion of students may forgone cheating or cheat
incompletely. It fits to the data. However, this model is not extended for group
decision making, that is why it has problem in explaining differences between
individuals and groups. Last but not least, studies distinguishing individuals
and groups as decision units found that groups subordinate to diverse processes
than individuals. Literature argues that groups learn faster and are concerned
about welfare within a group more than of outer people. It corresponds with
our findings just partly. Younger students cheat more often in groups but the
differential between older individuals and groups is insignificant. The overall
effect is still substantial and significant. Therefore further research is needed
in order to explore individual and group decision making dissimilarities.
The experiment presented here came with an approach how to measure natural
level of cheating with special focus on group decision making. However, there
are still additional problems worth exploring. Firstly, even though the theory
is able to explain motivations of incomplete liars, there is absent concise theory
of group decision making and its implications for cheating. Then, some authors
argue that other-regarding preferences develop in the early childhood. It would
be interesting to increase age scale in order to include children of the age under
10 where the development of these preferences is supposed to be the most
significant. Lastly, further research could focus on cross-cultural and cross-
countries differences. We consider relevant to look at the interference of general
level of dishonesty and corruption in a given culture or country and determine
some linkages in a cross country experiment.
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Appendix A
Title of Appendix One
Table A.1: Whole sample regression
Table A.2: Individual treatment regression
Table A.3: Group treatment regression
Table A.4: Younger regression
Table A.5: Older regression
Table A.6: Endogenous treatment regression
Table A.7: Understood cheating possibility regressions
Table A.8: Regressions of Understood cheating possibility on explanatory vari-
ables
Table A.9: Randomization check
Table A.10: Correlation check
Table A.11: Robustness check – Whole sample regression
Table A.12: Robustness check – Individual treatment regression
Table A.13: Robustness check – Group treatment regression
Table A.14: Robustness check – Younger regression
Table A.15: Robustness check – Older regression
Table A.1: Whole sample regression
Dependent variable High reward 0 reward 1 rewards 2 rewards 3 rewards 4 rewards 5 rewards High reward 0 reward 1 rewards 2 rewards 3 rewards 4 rewards 5 rewards
Sample Whole sample
Older 0.293*** -0.150*** -0.0369 -0.0587 0.141* 0.134+ 0.0144 0.271 -0.233** -0.0772 -0.787*** -0.216 0.364* 0.0426
(0.000802) (0.00272) (0.534) (0.296) (0.0698) (0.105) (0.861) (0.266) (0.0321) (0.206) (7.45e-09) (0.316) (0.0781) (0.822)
Female 0.0336 -0.0225 0.0701* -0.0846** 0.0316 0.0298 -0.0306 0.0557 -0.0215 0.0567* -0.0884** 0.0295 0.0701 -0.0323
(0.594) (0.472) (0.0810) (0.0480) (0.576) (0.601) (0.588) (0.401) (0.637) (0.0961) (0.0234) (0.638) (0.242) (0.588)
Group treatment 0.197** -0.198*** 0.0455 -0.0307 0.0305 0.131+ 0.0513 0.157 -0.113 -0.0129 0.0111 0.128 0.199 0.0474
(0.0222) (0.00103) (0.410) (0.587) (0.714) (0.116) (0.527) (0.471) (0.194) (0.876) (0.917) (0.426) (0.200) (0.759)
Older∗Group treatment -0.334** 0.474*** 0.0305 0.00151 -0.118 -0.170* 0.0262 0.301 -0.238
(0.0146) (0.00136) (0.719) (0.986) (0.258) (0.0897) (0.819) (0.190)
Number of siblings -0.0687+ 0.0124 0.0197 0.0280 0.00941 -0.00353 -0.0832* -0.0649 0.0119 0.0103 0.0254 0.00384 0.00339 -0.0825*
(0.121) (0.576) (0.478) (0.328) (0.802) (0.927) (0.0562) (0.153) (0.717) (0.651) (0.296) (0.924) (0.930) (0.0604)
Education of parents -0.0406 0.0512+ -0.0304 -0.00735 -0.0665 -0.00569 0.0403 -0.0547 0.0753+ -0.0150 -0.00562 -0.0687 -0.0205 0.0369
(0.608) (0.131) (0.571) (0.886) (0.354) (0.938) (0.578) (0.489) (0.136) (0.721) (0.896) (0.359) (0.783) (0.614)
Class fixed effects no no no no no no no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 174 199 199 209 226 226
p-value – *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p<0.15
Table A.2: Individual treatment regression
Dependent variable High reward 0 reward 1 rewards 2 rewards 3 rewards 4 rewards 5 rewards High reward 0 reward 1 rewards 2 rewards 3 rewards 4 rewards 5 rewards
Sample Individual treatment
Older 0.270*** -0.179*** -0.0151 -0.0671 0.158* 0.113 -0.00381 0.303** -0.183** -0.0509 -0.0542 0.125 0.217* -0.0388
(0.00290) (0.00413) (0.761) (0.296) (0.0582) (0.157) (0.958) (0.0180) (0.0355) (0.410) (0.577) (0.270) (0.0600) (0.706)
Female 0.0332 -0.0472 0.0121 0.00705 0.00702 0.122+ -0.0935 0.0413 -0.0485 0.0240 -0.00876 0.0148 0.125+ -0.0941
(0.710) (0.342) (0.804) (0.910) (0.932) (0.114) (0.201) (0.649) (0.333) (0.613) (0.889) (0.857) (0.108) (0.204)
Number of siblings 0.00363 -0.0103 -0.0167 0.0195 -0.00308 0.0371 -0.0450 0.00775 -0.0108 -0.0175 0.0166 -0.00317 0.0429 -0.0457
(0.949) (0.769) (0.604) (0.608) (0.948) (0.392) (0.326) (0.892) (0.760) (0.573) (0.656) (0.946) (0.326) (0.319)
Education of parents -0.0783 0.104** -0.0288 -0.0210 -0.0271 -0.0455 0.00968 -0.0801 0.104** -0.0187 -0.0250 -0.0265 -0.0609 0.0140
(0.397) (0.0470) (0.577) (0.745) (0.749) (0.573) (0.896) (0.388) (0.0479) (0.705) (0.696) (0.755) (0.455) (0.852)
Class fixed effects no no no no no no no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117
p-value – *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p<0.15
Table A.3: Group treatment regression
Dependent variable High reward 0 reward 1 rewards 2 rewards 3 rewards 4 rewards 5 rewards High reward 0 reward 1 rewards 2 rewards 3 rewards 4 rewards 5 rewards
Sample Group treatment
Older -0.0472 0.0783** -0.0102 -0.0676 0.0277 -0.0977 0.0471 0.150 0.0550 -0.865*** 0.0155 -0.215 0.228 0.105
(0.603) (0.0444) (0.895) (0.390) (0.726) (0.245) (0.590) (0.548) (0.621) (2.11e-06) (0.786) (0.322) (0.325) (0.627)
1 female 0.0459 0.00441 0.138 0.0514 0.0238 -0.0464 0.0806 0.0226 0.130 0.0920 0.0525 -0.0498
(0.676) (0.901) (0.161) (0.608) (0.822) (0.679) (0.476) (0.822) (0.252) (0.442) (0.631) (0.660)
2 females 0.00973 0.0548 0.117 -0.150 -0.0285 -0.0337 0.0788 0.0440 0.257 0.103 -0.0915* 0.00920 0.0112 0.0259
(0.949) (0.397) (0.416) (0.177) (0.822) (0.822) (0.586) (0.791) (0.210) (0.569) (0.0671) (0.956) (0.946) (0.865)
3 females 0.00434 0.110 -0.00415 -0.0741 0.0955 -0.0229 0.000309 0.156 -0.0135 0.0697 0.0307 -0.0867
(0.979) (0.284) (0.972) (0.545) (0.543) (0.873) (0.999) (0.459) (0.814) (0.700) (0.852) (0.548)
Endogenous treatment -0.121 0.0434 0.0245 0.0712 -0.134 0.00964 0.0375 -0.243 -0.00533 -0.0721 0.974*** 0.190 -0.244 0.186
(0.302) (0.283) (0.797) (0.537) (0.175) (0.926) (0.728) (0.332) (0.972) (0.759) (0) (0.392) (0.260) (0.360)
Number of siblings -0.241*** 0.0415* 0.103+ 0.0957 0.0432 -0.155* -0.175* -0.252*** 0.119+ 0.108+ 0.0397 0.0375 -0.153* -0.196*
(0.00399) (0.0892) (0.111) (0.182) (0.516) (0.0714) (0.0653) (0.00497) (0.138) (0.150) (0.167) (0.652) (0.0928) (0.0504)
Education of parents 0.127 -0.0864 -0.0196 -0.0374 -0.287* 0.167 0.162 0.0824 -0.339+ -0.0209 -0.00573 -0.274+ 0.159 0.160
(0.473) (0.286) (0.893) (0.800) (0.0977) (0.219) (0.325) (0.647) (0.149) (0.891) (0.927) (0.144) (0.251) (0.354)
Friends -0.0692 -0.0139 0.00639 0.102 0.0473 -0.182* 0.0867 -0.0528 -0.0357 0.0274 0.0224 0.0114 -0.175+ 0.142
(0.526) (0.658) (0.946) (0.248) (0.614) (0.0750) (0.397) (0.651) (0.683) (0.793) (0.579) (0.919) (0.109) (0.183)
Class fixed effects no no no no no no no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 109 109 90 77 109 109 109 109 57 67 60 92 109 109
p-value – *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p<0.15
Table A.4: Younger regression
Dependent variable High reward 0 reward 1 rewards 2 rewards 3 rewards 4 rewards 5 rewards High reward 0 reward 1 rewards 2 rewards 3 rewards 4 rewards 5 rewards
Sample Younger
Group treatment 0.210** -0.231*** 0.0693 -0.0247 0.0436 0.100 0.0480 0.160 -0.169 0.0645 -0.0581 0.143 -0.149 0.0468
(0.0316) (0.000922) (0.273) (0.701) (0.569) (0.212) (0.558) (0.407) (0.189) (0.568) (0.641) (0.315) (0.386) (0.769)
Female 0.173* -0.0303 0.0319 -0.163** 0.0581 0.0573 0.0578 0.213** -0.0409 0.0347 -0.201*** 0.0280 0.106 0.0953
(0.0661) (0.524) (0.583) (0.0138) (0.427) (0.459) (0.461) (0.0356) (0.680) (0.589) (0.00583) (0.730) (0.192) (0.250)
Number of siblings -0.122+ 0.00950 0.0469 0.0575 0.0463 -0.0913 -0.0734 -0.133* 0.00950 0.0557 0.0546 0.0453 -0.0997+ -0.0770
(0.123) (0.799) (0.348) (0.266) (0.450) (0.172) (0.281) (0.0988) (0.903) (0.293) (0.272) (0.488) (0.142) (0.257)
Education of parents 0.00717 0.0726* -0.114 -0.0545 -0.170* 0.144+ 0.0394 -0.00765 0.168+ -0.0917 -0.0558 -0.177* 0.142+ 0.0255
(0.952) (0.0944) (0.179) (0.492) (0.0891) (0.149) (0.696) (0.949) (0.104) (0.288) (0.480) (0.0881) (0.140) (0.803)
Class fixed effects no no no no no no no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 68 103 114 106 114 114
p-value – *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p<0.15
Table A.5: Older regression
Dependent variable High reward 0 reward 1 rewards 3 rewards 4 rewards 5 rewards 0 rewards High reward 0 reward 1 rewards 2 rewards 3 rewards 4 rewards 5 rewards
Sample Older
Group treatment -0.0778 0.0639 0.0325 -0.0334 -0.154+ -0.00699 0.0772 0.0794 0.0769 -0.496*** -0.410*** -0.258 0.203 0.0604
(0.386) (0.203) (0.529) (0.580) (0.101) (0.940) (0.387) (0.678) (0.433) (0) (0) (0.210) (0.203) (0.699)
Female -0.115 -0.0164 0.114** 0.00116 0.0125 -0.0206 -0.121+ -0.104 -0.0119 0.0657** -0.000395 0.0372 0.0146 -0.160*
(0.167) (0.708) (0.0358) (0.983) (0.884) (0.806) (0.136) (0.226) (0.805) (0.0409) (0.992) (0.693) (0.867) (0.0596)
Number of siblings -0.0188 0.0141 0.00153 0.00266 -0.00874 0.0406 -0.0804 -0.00594 0.0121 -0.00786 0.00365 -0.0203 0.0553 -0.0752
(0.714) (0.602) (0.959) (0.936) (0.863) (0.407) (0.165) (0.912) (0.690) (0.631) (0.862) (0.707) (0.269) (0.201)
Education of parents -0.0915 0.0149 0.0493 0.0339 0.0334 -0.141 0.0398 -0.100 0.0169 0.0226 0.0200 0.0381 -0.176+ 0.0488
(0.372) (0.794) (0.425) (0.602) (0.748) (0.191) (0.703) (0.321) (0.781) (0.442) (0.612) (0.727) (0.116) (0.639)
Class fixed effects no no no no no no no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 106 96 85 103 112 112
p-value – *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p<0.15
Table A.6: Endogenous treatment regression
Dependent variable High reward 0 reward 1 rewards 2 rewards 3 rewards 4 rewards 5 rewards High reward 0 reward 1 rewards 2 rewards 3 rewards 4 rewards 5 rewards
Sample Endogenous treatment
Older -0.0220 0.0549 0.00255 -0.0490 0.173+ -0.245* 0.128 -0.263 0.124 0.226 0.291+ -0.175 -0.284
(0.873) (0.465) (0.980) (0.760) (0.130) (0.0601) (0.321) (0.291) (0.568) (0.498) (0.145) (0.397) (0.159)
1 female 0.132 -0.00891 0.124 0.189* -0.0108 -0.0376 0.192 -0.0160 0.136 0.318** -0.00951 -0.0151
(0.322) (0.895) (0.230) (0.0698) (0.933) (0.767) (0.171) (0.884) (0.375) (0.0273) (0.941) (0.905)
2 females 0.173 0.181 0.0674 0.183 0.214 0.217 0.0216 0.141
(0.490) (0.286) (0.799) (0.485) (0.382) (0.334) (0.937) (0.594)
Number of siblings -0.0425 0.0134 -0.0328 0.117 0.0715 -0.161 0.0306 -0.0504 -0.00403 -0.0632 0.0784 0.0816 -0.202+ 0.0105
(0.762) (0.855) (0.754) (0.536) (0.423) (0.213) (0.808) (0.740) (0.973) (0.726) (0.749) (0.177) (0.136) (0.936)
Education of parents 0.0887 -0.102 -0.000288 -0.0156 -0.155 0.148 0.109 0.0634 -0.238 0.0160 -0.0673 -0.0953 0.128 0.115
(0.658) (0.383) (0.998) (0.943) (0.337) (0.380) (0.568) (0.755) (0.278) (0.939) (0.853) (0.379) (0.462) (0.549)
Friends -0.132 -0.0323 0.00653 0.328+ -0.155+ 0.0119 0.0317 -0.164 -0.0356 0.0382 0.398 -0.143** 0.0668 0.0606
(0.405) (0.660) (0.955) (0.112) (0.110) (0.934) (0.814) (0.354) (0.781) (0.832) (0.211) (0.0392) (0.672) (0.668)
Faster formed group 0.0950 -0.0142 -0.0742 -0.0547 -0.165* 0.0640 0.193+ 0.119 -0.0222 -0.162 -0.136 -0.145* 0.0735 0.209*
(0.469) (0.828) (0.465) (0.733) (0.0776) (0.593) (0.104) (0.382) (0.835) (0.322) (0.572) (0.0621) (0.542) (0.0749)
Class fixed effects no no no no no no no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 56 56 52 30 52 59 59 56 38 34 21 45 59 59
p-value – *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p<0.15
Table A.7: Understood cheating possibility regressions
Dependent variable High reward High reward High reward High reward High reward High reward High reward High reward High reward High reward
Sample Whole sample Individuals Groups Younger Older
Older 0.260** 0.260** 0.254** 0.254** 0.144 0.414
(0.0416) (0.0415) (0.0485) (0.0485) (0.464) (0.252)
Female -0.0115 -0.00376 0.0428 0.0428 0.116 0.137 -0.123 -0.124
(0.909) (0.971) (0.753) (0.753) (0.460) (0.409) (0.333) (0.330)
Group 0.121 0.156 0.179 0.125 -0.131 -0.189
(0.393) (0.391) (0.281) (0.568) (0.357) (0.327)
Older∗Group treatment -0.273 -0.345
(0.219) (0.246)
Number of siblings 0.00585 0.00928 0.0725 0.0725 -0.142 -0.184 -0.133 -0.125 0.0643 0.0740
(0.936) (0.901) (0.436) (0.436) (0.344) (0.245) (0.331) (0.363) (0.466) (0.418)
Education of parents 0.113 0.117 0.0348 0.0348 0.647** 0.622* 0.0140 0.0204 0.139 0.151
(0.359) (0.344) (0.794) (0.794) (0.0498) (0.0666) (0.940) (0.913) (0.390) (0.361)




Understood possibility of cheating 0.234** 0.226* 0.183 0.183 0.273 0.249 0.310* 0.292+ 0.200 0.193
(0.0436) (0.0547) (0.259) (0.259) (0.189) (0.238) (0.0785) (0.111) (0.246) (0.262)
Class fixed effects yes no yes no yes no yes no yes no
Observations 93 93 57 57 36 36 46 46 47 47
p-value – *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p<0.15
Table A.8: Regressions of Understood cheating possibility on explana-
tory variables
Dependent variable Understood cheating possibility
Sample Whole sample Individuals Groups Younger Older
Older 0.221* 0.216* 0.195+ 0.195+ -0.276 -0.444+
(0.0925) (0.0997) (0.105) (0.105) (0.180) (0.103)
Female 0.127 0.151+ 0.316*** 0.316*** 0.206+ 0.286** 0.0253 0.0218
(0.190) (0.131) (0.00738) (0.00738) (0.131) (0.0492) (0.857) (0.878)
Group 0.141 0.00339 0.0443 -0.185 -0.329** -0.349*
(0.306) (0.984) (0.768) (0.345) (0.0300) (0.0668)
Older∗Group treatment -0.507** -0.423+
(0.0197) (0.118)
Number of siblings -0.0925 -0.0805 -0.0389 -0.0389 -0.0441 -0.0800 0.139 0.161+ -0.224** -0.221**
(0.176) (0.246) (0.602) (0.602) (0.799) (0.657) (0.217) (0.147) (0.0140) (0.0172)
Education of parents -0.121 -0.109 -0.0475 -0.0475 0.0216 0.0455 -0.240 -0.237
(0.287) (0.345) (0.675) (0.675) (0.896) (0.785) (0.150) (0.162)
1 Female -0.407* -0.387+
(0.0986) (0.131)
2 Females -0.159 0.0470
(0.627) (0.899)
3 Females -0.241 -0.152
(0.496) (0.676)




Class fixed effects yes no yes no yes no yes no yes no
Observations 93 93 57 57 33 33 46 46 47 47
p-value – *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p<0.15
Table A.9: Randomization check
Individual Group t-test Endogenous Exogenous F-stat
treatment treatment p-value treatment treatment p-value
Older 0.51 0.48 0.59 0.49 0.46 0.82
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Female 0.53 0.50 0.70 0.46 0.56 0.53
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Number of siblings 1.48 1.33 0.12 1.32 1.34 0.30
(0.87) (0.56) (0.49) (0.64)
Education of parents 0.63 0.93 0.00 0.88 0.98 0.00
(0.48) (0.26) (0.33) (0.14)
Education of father 4.50 4.27 0.04 4.24 4.31 0.11
(0.93) (0.74) (0.82) (0.65)
Education of mother 4.38 4.28 0.36 4.21 4.35 0.44
(0.93) (0.65) (0.71) (0.56)
Observations 117 109 59 50
Table A.10: Correlation check
Variable Older Female Number Education Understood p. Group
of siblings of parents of cheating
Older 1.0000
Female -0.0882 1.0000
Number of siblings 0.1070 0.0586 1.0000
Education of parents -0.0365 0.0721 -0.0572 1.0000
Understood pos. of cheating -0.0168 0.1180 -0.1112 -0.1065 1.0000
Group -0.0357 -0.0253 -0.1027 0.3516* -0.1239 1.0000
p-value – *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.11: Robustness check – Whole sample regression
Dependent variable High reward 0 rewards 1 reward 2 rewards 3 rewards 4 rewards 5 rewards High reward 0 rewards 1 reward 2 rewards 3 rewards 4 rewards 5 rewards
Sample Whole sample
Older 1.445*** -2.638*** -1.015 -1.239* -0.0342 -0.555 1.564** -2.482** -1.225 -1.089 0.574 -0.656
(0.00104) (0.00293) (0.210) (0.0700) (0.953) (0.347) (0.0136) (0.0423) (0.229) (0.311) (0.499) (0.416)
Female 0.168 -0.457 0.611 -0.926* -0.0307 -0.264 0.267 -0.353 0.659 -1.083** 0.153 -0.245
(0.576) (0.412) (0.263) (0.0693) (0.939) (0.519) (0.402) (0.546) (0.261) (0.0475) (0.725) (0.585)
Group treatment 0.926** -2.967*** 0.341 -0.428 0.420 0.0795 0.640 -17.87 -0.233 -0.223 -0.528 -0.451
(0.0247) (0.00951) (0.648) (0.543) (0.499) (0.897) (0.439) (0.996) (0.843) (0.874) (0.702) (0.686)
Older∗Group treatment -1.499** 4.279*** 0.932 0.678 -0.262 0.676 -0.155 19.84 -14.21 -14.55 2.023 1.831
(0.0158) (0.00401) (0.387) (0.514) (0.753) (0.414) (0.915) (0.996) (0.997) (0.997) (0.273) (0.285)
Number of siblings -0.329+ 0.137 0.200 0.227 -0.0395 -0.418 -0.317+ 0.139 0.143 0.282 0.0160 -0.397
(0.117) (0.736) (0.562) (0.496) (0.880) (0.162) (0.142) (0.739) (0.696) (0.408) (0.953) (0.201)
Education of parents -0.186 1.225+ -0.0272 0.210 0.224 0.482 -0.265 1.204+ 0.0537 0.234 0.160 0.464
(0.632) (0.105) (0.967) (0.723) (0.645) (0.356) (0.503) (0.114) (0.938) (0.702) (0.748) (0.388)
Constant 0.556 -0.525 -1.335+ -0.0884 -0.174 0.435 0.590 -0.797 -0.996 -0.808 -0.877 0.330
(0.244) (0.566) (0.124) (0.906) (0.793) (0.521) (0.278) (0.416) (0.289) (0.376) (0.305) (0.670)
Class fixed effects no no no no no no no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 226
p-value – *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p<0.15
Table A.12: Robustness check – Individual treatment regression
Dependent variable High reward 0 rewards 1 reward 2 rewards 3 rewards 4 rewards 5 rewards High reward 0 rewards 1 reward 2 rewards 3 rewards 4 rewards 5 rewards
Sample Individual treatment
Older 1.268*** -2.569*** -0.852 -1.173* -0.121 -0.663 1.454** -2.480** -1.145 -0.965 0.590 -0.713
(0.00341) (0.00350) (0.281) (0.0845) (0.837) (0.261) (0.0208) (0.0430) (0.260) (0.363) (0.489) (0.378)
Female 0.189 -0.655 -0.581 0.0646 -0.0669 0.493 0.221 -0.716 0.146 -0.200 0.480 -0.615
(0.649) (0.350) (0.317) (0.934) (0.918) (0.375) (0.599) (0.314) (0.853) (0.763) (0.397) (0.296)
Number of siblings 0.0130 -0.159 -0.192 0.164 0.182 -0.247 0.0271 -0.163 -0.233 0.156 0.223 -0.248
(0.961) (0.744) (0.693) (0.673) (0.543) (0.487) (0.918) (0.738) (0.642) (0.687) (0.467) (0.486)
Education of parents -0.357 1.561* -0.211 0.00444 -0.126 0.232 -0.376 1.563* -0.161 -0.0234 -0.188 0.255
(0.416) (0.0793) (0.788) (0.995) (0.819) (0.696) (0.395) (0.0803) (0.839) (0.972) (0.736) (0.671)
Constant 0.225 -0.365 -0.368 -0.284 -0.576 0.558 0.236 -0.569 -0.0927 -0.796 -1.171 0.444
(0.685) (0.734) (0.715) (0.740) (0.448) (0.463) (0.694) (0.611) (0.931) (0.418) (0.207) (0.594)
Class fixed effects no no no no no no no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117
p-value – *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p<0.15
Table A.13: Robustness check – Group treatment regression
Dependent variable High reward 0 rewards 1 reward 2 rewards 3 rewards 4 rewards 5 rewards High reward 0 rewards 1 reward 2 rewards 3 rewards 4 rewards 5 rewards
Sample Group treatment
Older -0.219 2.218* -0.0850 -0.632 -0.619 -0.0111 0.809 20.66 -14.25 -16.87 2.148 1.639
(0.637) (0.0878) (0.911) (0.470) (0.342) (0.986) (0.567) (0.997) (0.997) (0.997) (0.233) (0.329)
1 female 0.259 0.0867 0.597 -16.48 -0.273 -0.490 0.413 0.000376 0.680 -18.32 -0.188 -0.465
(0.648) (0.947) (0.516) (0.990) (0.730) (0.537) (0.495) (1.000) (0.515) (0.994) (0.828) (0.610)
2 females 0.0733 1.318 0.913 -1.479 -0.0487 0.432 0.234 2.237 1.281 -2.696 0.336 0.501
(0.924) (0.429) (0.472) (0.350) (0.966) (0.669) (0.789) (0.221) (0.438) (0.153) (0.799) (0.689)
3 females 0.0952 2.111 -14.60 0.357 0.740 0.308 0.0934 1.175 -16.91 -0.794 -0.252 -0.538
(0.908) (0.293) (0.992) (0.785) (0.498) (0.772) (0.919) (0.568) (0.995) (0.674) (0.839) (0.667)
Endogenous treatment -0.571 1.777 0.737 1.344 0.714 0.886 -1.075 -1.257 15.76 0.266 -1.993 0.445
(0.338) (0.211) (0.413) (0.254) (0.367) (0.251) (0.436) (0.583) (0.997) (1.000) (0.291) (0.793)
Number of siblings -1.198*** 1.083 0.456 0.433 -1.028+ -1.024+ -1.282*** 1.396 0.407 0.354 -1.300* -1.389*
(0.00436) (0.204) (0.460) (0.580) (0.102) (0.103) (0.00526) (0.199) (0.578) (0.699) (0.0754) (0.0631)
Education of parents 0.594 -0.524 1.043 0.857 2.252* 1.951+ 0.418 -1.506 1.318 0.674 2.199+ 2.004+
(0.466) (0.733) (0.429) (0.540) (0.0783) (0.126) (0.637) (0.378) (0.390) (0.682) (0.102) (0.145)
Friends -0.337 -0.759 -0.276 0.560 -1.111 0.0156 -0.278 -0.574 0.215 0.712 -0.813 0.608
(0.535) (0.503) (0.760) (0.567) (0.157) (0.983) (0.633) (0.656) (0.835) (0.583) (0.348) (0.466)
Constant 2.523** -5.243** -2.620+ -2.111 -0.131 -0.578 2.344+ -21.14 -3.520 -1.261 -0.877 -1.325
(0.0315) (0.0475) (0.143) (0.329) (0.937) (0.726) (0.127) (0.997) (0.163) (0.661) (0.690) (0.527)
Class fixed effects no no no no no no no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109
p-value – *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p<0.15
Table A.14: Robustness check – Younger regression
Dependent variable High reward 0 rewards 1 reward 2 rewards 3 rewards 4 rewards 5 rewards High reward 0 rewards 1 reward 2 rewards 3 rewards 4 rewards 5 rewards
Sample Younger
Group treatment 0.907** -3.132*** 0.379 -0.517 0.156 -0.0728 0.418 -16.21 -0.165 -0.139 -1.083 -0.908
(0.0358) (0.00713) (0.632) (0.496) (0.815) (0.911) (0.630) (0.991) (0.896) (0.926) (0.451) (0.440)
Female 0.743* -0.734 -0.0142 -1.607** -0.0537 -0.0242 0.917** -0.392 0.248 -1.571* 0.479 0.440
(0.0689) (0.333) (0.985) (0.0299) (0.933) (0.969) (0.0395) (0.623) (0.762) (0.0514) (0.505) (0.531)
Number of siblings -0.515+ -0.249 0.190 0.195 -0.739 -0.652 -0.573+ -0.272 0.261 0.230 -0.811 -0.648
(0.134) (0.690) (0.757) (0.737) (0.170) (0.221) (0.106) (0.673) (0.686) (0.707) (0.160) (0.249)
Education of parents 0.0433 1.986** -0.0754 0.469 1.757* 1.058 -0.0312 1.947** 0.0744 0.378 1.849* 1.005
(0.933) (0.0383) (0.929) (0.567) (0.0564) (0.172) (0.953) (0.0432) (0.935) (0.657) (0.0508) (0.209)
Constant 0.329 -0.349 -0.910 0.0611 -0.349 0.283 0.485 -0.698 -0.932 -0.728 -1.141 0.0514
(0.611) (0.772) (0.425) (0.954) (0.753) (0.774) (0.493) (0.576) (0.458) (0.536) (0.368) (0.962)
Class fixed effects no no no no no no no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114
p-value – *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p<0.15
Table A.15: Robustness check – Older regression
Dependent variable High reward 0 rewards 1 reward 2 rewards 3 rewards 4 rewards 5 rewards High reward 0 rewards 1 reward 2 rewards 3 rewards 4 rewards 5 rewards
Sample Older
Group treatment -0.428 1.741+ 1.062 0.223 0.573 0.889+ 0.461 2.434 -13.54 -14.14 1.924+ 1.364
(0.396) (0.101) (0.206) (0.786) (0.355) (0.145) (0.703) (0.192) (0.995) (0.995) (0.129) (0.303)
Female -0.639 -0.237 1.443+ 0.00208 -0.150 -0.548 -0.606 -0.177 1.485+ -0.303 -0.139 -0.858
(0.166) (0.789) (0.104) (0.998) (0.782) (0.332) (0.212) (0.850) (0.124) (0.698) (0.809) (0.168)
Number of siblings -0.121 0.320 0.0944 0.0543 0.204 -0.341 0.322 -0.0531 -0.159 0.140 0.290 -0.292
(0.663) (0.566) (0.837) (0.901) (0.506) (0.370) (0.855) (0.582) (0.757) (0.756) (0.361) (0.465)
Education of parents -0.574 0.0353 0.673 0.298 -0.616 0.0890 -0.644 0.0442 0.622 0.404 -0.755 0.185
(0.377) (0.978) (0.584) (0.753) (0.326) (0.901) (0.323) (0.973) (0.612) (0.674) (0.243) (0.803)
Constant 2.326*** -2.783* -3.246** -1.493 -0.104 0.106 2.398*** -2.779+ -2.820* -1.992+ -0.0563 -0.0770
(0.00268) (0.0693) (0.0295) (0.182) (0.888) (0.895) (0.00462) (0.104) (0.0607) (0.123) (0.944) (0.934)
Class fixed effects no no no no no no no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112
p-value – *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p<0.15
Appendix B
Questionnaires - English translation
Individual treatment questionnaire: page 1–3
Endogenous treatment questionnaire, first part: page 4
Exogenous treatment questionnaire, first part: page 5
Endogenous and exogenous treatment questionnaire, second part: page 6–8
Institute of Economic Studies – Charles University 
Environment and you? 
All of the information will be used anonymously and for the research purposes only 
Please, fill in the questionnaire carefully! 
 
Circle the correct answer! 
a. Your age ___________ 
b. Boy / girl 
c. Father’s highest education level - university / college / secondary school / 
         vocational school / primary school 
d. Mother’s highest education level - university / college / secondary school /  
        vocational school / primary school 
e. Number of siblings __________________ 
 Number of older sisters ___________             Number of younger sisters ___________ 
 Number of older brothers ___________          Number of younger brothers ___________ 
f. Parents live:             together   /     separated 
 
1. Are you interested in environmental protection? 
a. Yes. 
b. Yes, a little. 
c. Not so much. 
d. No. 
e. I do not know. 
 
2. Do you know what exactly does environment mean?  
a. Environment is a place where I live. 
b. The complex of physical, chemical, and biotic factors (as climate, soil, and living 
things) that acts upon an organism or an ecological community and ultimately 
determine its form and survival.  
c. Environment is a complex of all external components both animate and inanimate – 
that surround us. 




3. Assign importance to the following choices according to your preferences:   
a. Economic performance 
b. Environmental protection 
c. Search for alternative sources of energy 
d. Protection of human rights 











5. If not, choose or describe the environmental problems of your place of residence? 
a. Air pollution (e.g. smog) 
b. Too many cars 
c. Lack of green vegetation 
d. Noise 
e. Dirty streets 
f. other: _____________________________________________________________ 
 
6. What does the term “recycling” stand for? 
a. Recycling is the process of re-using a given product.  
b. Recycling is the place where oversized waste can be taken 
c. Recycling is the complex of animate organisms. 
d. Recycling is lowering of the impacts of nature devastation caused by the humankind. 
 
7. Assign a colour of waste container to a specific type of waste. 
a. Blue    





2. Clear glass 
3. Hazardous waste    
4. Paper 
5. Coloured glass 
 
8. Which waste do you sort? 
a.   Plastic   b.   Glass   c.   Paper 
d.   Batteries   e.   Chemicals (e.g. drugs) f.   Eggshells 
g.   Juice & milk packages  h.   Metals   i.   Bio-waste 
 
9. How many kilograms of waste does an average person in the Czech Republic produce? 
a. 150-200kg 
b. 200-250kg 
c. More than 250kg 
10. How to recycle a light bulb? 
a. Bring it back to an electronics store or to a civic amenity site. 
b. Throw it to a green garbage bin for glass. 
c. Throw it to a composite waste bin. 
d. Throw it to either a green garbage bin for glass or a composite waste bin. 
 
11. Do you consider sorting of waste to be important? 
a. Yes. 
b. No. 
c. I do not know. 
 













15. Estimate how many litres of water are used by an average person in the Czech Republic per 
day. 
a. around 50 l 
b. around 130 l 
c. around 300 l 
 





17. Estimate how many litres of water are needed to produce 0.2 l of orange juice? 
a. 15 litres 
b. 1 litre 
c. 50 litres 
d. 170 litres 
What number did you throw on a dice? _________ 
Institute of Economic Studies – Charles University 
Environment and you? 
All of the information will be used anonymously and for the research purposes only 
Please, fill in the questionnaire carefully! 
 
Circle the correct answer! 
a. Your age ___________ 
b. Boy / girl 
c. Father’s highest education level - university / college / secondary school / 
         vocational school / primary school 
d. Mother’s highest education level - university / college / secondary school /  
        vocational school / primary school 
e. Number of siblings __________________ 
 Number of older sisters ___________             Number of younger sisters ___________ 
 Number of older brothers ___________          Number of younger brothers ___________ 
f. Parents live:             together   /     separated 
g.  In this group you have (Total count has to be equal to the number of group members): 
 Best friend 
 Friend 
 Classmate, we do not know each other very well 
 
    0   /   1   /   2    
0   /   1   /   2    
0   /   1   /   2   
 
Institute of Economic Studies – Charles University 
Environment and you? 
All of the information will be used anonymously and for the research purposes only 
Please, fill in the questionnaire carefully! 
 
Circle the correct answer! 
a. Your age ___________ 
b. Boy / girl 
c. Father’s highest education level - university / college / secondary school / 
         vocational school / primary school 
d. Mother’s highest education level - university / college / secondary school /  
        vocational school / primary school 
e. Number of siblings __________________ 
 Number of older sisters ___________             Number of younger sisters ___________ 
 Number of older brothers ___________          Number of younger brothers ___________ 
f. Parents live:             together   /     separated 
7.  If you could choose group members, would you choose the same members or others? 
a) I would choose one other group member 
b) I would choose two other group members 
c) I would not change it 
 
g.  In this group you have (Total count has to be equal to the number of group members): 
 Best friend 
 Friend 
 Classmate, we do not know each other very well 
 
    0   /   1   /   2    
0   /   1   /   2    
0   /   1   /   2   
  
Institute of Economic Studies – Charles University 
Environment and you? 
All of the information will be used anonymously and for the research purposes only 
Please, fill in the questionnaire carefully! 
  
Circle the correct answer! 
1. Are you interested in environmental protection? 
a. Yes. 
b. Yes, a little. 
c. Not so much. 
d. No. 
e. I do not know. 
 
2. Do you know what exactly does environment mean?  
a. Environment is a place where I live. 
b. The complex of physical, chemical, and biotic factors (as climate, soil, and living 
things) that acts upon an organism or an ecological community and ultimately 
determine its form and survival.  
c. Environment is a complex of all external components both animate and inanimate – 
that surround us. 




3. Assign importance to the following choices according to your preferences:   
a. Economic performance 
b. Environmental protection 
c. Search for alternative sources of energy 
d. Protection of human rights 








4. Assign a colour of waste container to a specific type of waste. 
a. Blue    





2. Clear glass 
3. Hazardous waste    
4. Paper 
5. Coloured glass 
 
5. Which waste do you sort? 
a.   Plastic   b.   Glass   c.   Paper 
d.   Batteries   e.   Chemicals (e.g. drugs) f.   Eggshells 
g.   Juice & milk packages  h.   Metals   i.   Bio-waste 
 
6. How many kilograms of waste does an average person in the Czech Republic produce? 
a. 150-200kg 
b. 200-250kg 
c. More than 250kg 
 
7. How to recycle a light bulb? 
a. Bring it back to an electronics store or to a civic amenity site. 
b. Throw it to a green garbage bin for glass. 
c. Throw it to a composite waste bin. 
d. Throw it to either a green garbage bin for glass or a composite waste bin. 
8. Do you consider sorting of waste to be important? 
a. Yes. 
b. No. 
c. I do not know. 
 






10. Is environmental education at your school sufficient? 
a. Yes. 
b. No. 
c. We do not know 
 
 
11. Do you consider environmental education important? 
a. Yes. 
b. No. 





12. Estimate how many litres of water are used by an average person in the Czech Republic per 
day. 
a. around 50 l 
b. around 130 l 
c. around 300 l 
 






14. Estimate how many litres of water are needed to produce 0.2 l of orange juice? 
a. 15 litres 
b. 1 litre 
c. 50 litres 
d. 170 litres 
 
What number did you throw on a dice? _________ 
 
